The Confederate railroad
"system" was composed of four separate zones of operation. Two of these
were completely isolated from the others. The remaining two had only
three connection points between them. |
The smallest zone was the state of Florida,
east of Pensacola. The operations here were strictly supporting the
local Confederate forces and the roads were hard pressed to do even that
work. The zone had slightly over 400 miles of track with only 21
locomotives and about 70 cars. The zone had no railroad support
infrastructure (iron mines, foundries, rolling mills, etc) and it
appears that only a few items of support were provided from Savannah. A
connection with the main Confederate railroad system was constructed,
but finished in literally the last days of the war. |
The other isolated zone was the Trans
Mississippi area. Most of the Texas railroads connected to each other,
while the Louisiana and Arkansas railroads were each isolated from the
others. The 800 miles of track supported 60 locomotives and some 750
cars, but 1/3 of the roads did not connect with any other road. The
roads in the Houston and Galveston areas were an integral part of the
Army's defense plan for Texas and were leased by the Government in 1862.
As with the Florida zone, there was no support infrastructure for the
railroads. Early in the war, a connection was planned from Texas to New
Orleans, but no work had been accomplished when New Orleans fell. Later,
a connection was planned between Shreveport and northeastern Texas. The
iron necessary for the connection could not be obtained and the
connection was not completed. |
The rest of the Confederate railroad system
was the core of the nation. Less well known, but by far the larger zone
was the southern and western roads -- in fact, every road not in
Virginia or North Carolina. Seventy-six roads spread over 6,300 miles,
with 850 locomotives and over 9,000 cars. All but about 750 miles were
main line -- that is, they connected to other roads or steamship ports,
allowing long distance shipments to take place with ease never before
seen in war. While shipping freight long distances, over several roads,
without changing cars, was not yet a reality for normal operations, the
speed of movement was still without precedence. Numerous troop movements
showed the power the railroads gave the undersized Confederate armies;
essential corn was shipped from western Alabama to the Army of Tennessee
and from southwestern Georgia to the Army of Northern Virginia; blockade
runner imports were moved from Charleston and Wilmington to Macon,
Augusta, Columbus and other important point; and cotton was moved from
Montgomery to the runner ports. |
The southern zone was not
fully connected -- a gap existed between Selma and Jackson and another
from Selma to Montgomery. While the latter one was crossed by using
steamboats, the former was filled in by relaying iron taken from the
Alabama & Florida (of Florida) Railroad near Pensacola. This zone had
iron, coal and industry (the Shelby Iron Works in Alabama and the
Markham Iron Works in Atlanta), but the resources were almost totally
used for Army and Navy requirements and only rarely for the railroads. |
The last zone was the
northeastern area -- Virginia and North Carolina. Twenty-six railroads
used almost 2,400 miles of track, with 300 locomotives and 3,500 cars.
While almost all of the southern zone was 5' gauge, the northeastern
zone was only 1/4 5' gauge, the rest being 4' 8 1/2" gauge. Some troop
movements in this zone are well known (Johnston to First Manassas,
Jackson to the Seven Days Battle, Longstreet to Georgia), but there were
many others to counter Union movements. The ability of the railroads to
supply Virginia allowed the war to remain in the same area, even after
two armies had consumed every bit of food and fodder in the state.
Richmond's position as the industrial center of the Confederate war
effort required the rail importation and export of vast quantities of
raw and finished goods. |
The construction of the
Piedmont Railroad in North Carolina provided the vital third line of
supply into the Richmond area. With Knoxville taken in 1863 and the
eastern route cut by Grant in mid-1864, Richmond, Petersburg and the
army could only be maintained over this one line. Railroads were so
critical in this area that Tredegar Iron Works was allowed to provide
some low level of support to the area railroads -- not enough, by far,
but more than the roads in the southern zone could get from their
industries. Additional iron works were being constructed south of
Raleigh and in Lynchburg when the war ended. |
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|
Florida |
Trans Mississippi |
Southern |
Northeastern |
Track (10,000 miles) |
4% |
8% |
64% |
24% |
Locomotives (1,225) |
2% |
5% |
69% |
24% |
Cars (13,300) |
0.5% |
5% |
68% |
26% |
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