The Four Railroad Zones

   The Confederate railroad "system" was composed of four separate zones of operation. Two of these were completely isolated from the others. The remaining two had only three connection points between them.
   The smallest zone was the state of Florida, east of Pensacola. The operations here were strictly supporting the local Confederate forces and the roads were hard pressed to do even that work. The zone had slightly over 400 miles of track with only 21 locomotives and about 70 cars. The zone had no railroad support infrastructure (iron mines, foundries, rolling mills, etc) and it appears that only a few items of support were provided from Savannah. A connection with the main Confederate railroad system was constructed, but finished in literally the last days of the war.
   The other isolated zone was the Trans Mississippi area. Most of the Texas railroads connected to each other, while the Louisiana and Arkansas railroads were each isolated from the others. The 800 miles of track supported 60 locomotives and some 750 cars, but 1/3 of the roads did not connect with any other road. The roads in the Houston and Galveston areas were an integral part of the Army's defense plan for Texas and were leased by the Government in 1862. As with the Florida zone, there was no support infrastructure for the railroads. Early in the war, a connection was planned from Texas to New Orleans, but no work had been accomplished when New Orleans fell. Later, a connection was planned between Shreveport and northeastern Texas. The iron necessary for the connection could not be obtained and the connection was not completed.
   The rest of the Confederate railroad system was the core of the nation. Less well known, but by far the larger zone was the southern and western roads -- in fact, every road not in Virginia or North Carolina. Seventy-six roads spread over 6,300 miles, with 850 locomotives and over 9,000 cars. All but about 750 miles were main line -- that is, they connected to other roads or steamship ports, allowing long distance shipments to take place with ease never before seen in war. While shipping freight long distances, over several roads, without changing cars, was not yet a reality for normal operations, the speed of movement was still without precedence. Numerous troop movements showed the power the railroads gave the undersized Confederate armies; essential corn was shipped from western Alabama to the Army of Tennessee and from southwestern Georgia to the Army of Northern Virginia; blockade runner imports were moved from Charleston and Wilmington to Macon, Augusta, Columbus and other important point; and cotton was moved from Montgomery to the runner ports.
   The southern zone was not fully connected -- a gap existed between Selma and Jackson and another from Selma to Montgomery. While the latter one was crossed by using steamboats, the former was filled in by relaying iron taken from the Alabama & Florida (of Florida) Railroad near Pensacola. This zone had iron, coal and industry (the Shelby Iron Works in Alabama and the Markham Iron Works in Atlanta), but the resources were almost totally used for Army and Navy requirements and only rarely for the railroads.
   The last zone was the northeastern area -- Virginia and North Carolina. Twenty-six railroads used almost 2,400 miles of track, with 300 locomotives and 3,500 cars. While almost all of the southern zone was 5' gauge, the northeastern zone was only 1/4 5' gauge, the rest being 4' 8 1/2" gauge. Some troop movements in this zone are well known (Johnston to First Manassas, Jackson to the Seven Days Battle, Longstreet to Georgia), but there were many others to counter Union movements. The ability of the railroads to supply Virginia allowed the war to remain in the same area, even after two armies had consumed every bit of food and fodder in the state. Richmond's position as the industrial center of the Confederate war effort required the rail importation and export of vast quantities of raw and finished goods.
   The construction of the Piedmont Railroad in North Carolina provided the vital third line of supply into the Richmond area. With Knoxville taken in 1863 and the eastern route cut by Grant in mid-1864, Richmond, Petersburg and the army could only be maintained over this one line. Railroads were so critical in this area that Tredegar Iron Works was allowed to provide some low level of support to the area railroads -- not enough, by far, but more than the roads in the southern zone could get from their industries. Additional iron works were being constructed south of Raleigh and in Lynchburg when the war ended.
 
  Florida Trans Mississippi Southern Northeastern
Track (10,000 miles) 4% 8% 64% 24%
Locomotives (1,225) 2% 5% 69% 24%
Cars (13,300) 0.5% 5% 68% 26%
 

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