{Endorsement on Lee to Seddon, January
26, 1863, Series 1, Vol. 25, Part 2, Page 598} |
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Subsistence Department |
January 28, 1863 |
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Fifteen months ago this
Bureau foresaw that the supply of cattle in Virginia would be
exhausted, and initiated an arrangement to bring hither cattle from
Texas to be put on the grass lands of Southwest Virginia and East
Tennessee for future use. The drought of the country prevented it.
The attempt was made and failed. The Secretary of War was asked
early last spring to reduce the beef ration one-fourth of a pound,
with an equivalent addition of flour, if required. This was done
April 28. The meat has held out longer than was expected. On or
about the same period the Commissary-General was sent for by the
President to meet Col. A. Cole, sent by General Johnston to
ascertain the sources of supply for the army, then about to fall
back on Richmond. In conference with General Lee and the President
the subject was considered and future prospects set forth. In
respect to the contemplated operations after General Lee took
command the Commissary. General of Subsistence urged the argument of
subsistence as imperative. After the repulse of the enemy the
Commissary-General of Subsistence urged the necessity of opening the
northern districts of Virginia to the operations of this Bureau, and
several times since General Lee was notified of impending want, so
that it has been long understood. Last winter the Commissary-General
of Subsistence urged that the necks and shanks of beeves, usually
excluded by regulations, should be used so as to make the most of
what was obtained. These significant facts must have prepared all
persons to whom they had been stated for the present condition,
which General Lee seems now to realize. In addition, the
Commissary-General of Subsistence has endeavored to hold as much
meat as possible for the army of Virginia, directing the chief
commissaries of other armies and districts, that in view of the
difficulties of transportation, and the lost and ruined condition of
so much, and such fertile territory previously held by us, they must
depend on their own districts as far as possible. Moreover, the
Commissary General has, in this very view, refused applications for
bacon, which would have been drafts on the stores at Atlanta, and
has thereby incurred the strictures of the general commanding the
Southeast. The present embarrassment is now due to the delay of
railroads in bringing the bacon hither. For that this Bureau is not
responsible, and it has often represented that some such catastrophe
must result sooner or later from such course unless a remedy were
applied. In respect to this particular instance, wheat was ordered
weeks ago from Atlanta. Colonel Wadley was telegraphed on the
subject, and the Secretary of War was addressed thereon, as he will
remember, when the bridges on the Holston and Watauga were burned by
the enemy; he was informed that a train of cars loaded with bacon
had been left on the west side of the burnt bridges. Agents have
been sent from here to hunt up and hurry on the cars, and the meat
when started was placed in charge of messengers. This was done
before General Lee's letter was referred to me. I had done all that
was in my power, and on the day before the letter was referred to me
I wrote to Lieut. Col. R. G. Cole, informing him of the railroad
delays, so that he might use the influence of his position to
prevent a repetition of what has several times crippled
transportation, and which is said to have been lately practiced
south of Richmond, to wit, keeping cars unemployed to meet expected
removal of troops. When the meat will reach here I cannot tell, and
I have been unable to hasten it by my efforts. The order of the War
Department, dated April 28, reducing the rations of meat and
increasing that of flour, as above referred to, has not been
observed in the army of Virginia for a period of between three and
four months, by order of General Lee, and the use of the whole beef
(necks and shanks included), which was attempted to be instituted by
the Commissary-General of Subsistence, has not been observed in that
army, the discontent and other obstacles being urged as
insurmountable in the field. At this post these things have
generally been availed of. But for the violation of the above order
and the failure to economize beef, the supplies for General Lee's
army would have lasted several weeks longer. The orders of the
Secretary of War to attempt to run the blockade from the Northern
lines were attended to as soon as received. It has been impossible
to organize a system as yet for want of suitable men, who have not
yet been found, and when they are found they must report to General
Lee, since without his protection they can do nothing. It may be as
well for him to make that arrangement. One such party has been
ordered already to report to him. Supplies cannot be gathered in the
country southwest of General Lee's army. It has been or is being
drained already. Nor can they be had on the south side of James
River. That country is held tributary in commissary supplies to
Petersburg and the south (except in hogs), and even if they were
there (as they are not), in quantity to feed General Lee's army,
they could not be had; neither time nor transportation will allow
it. All the transportation that can be begged will be needed to get
wheat to be converted into flour for the same army that now wants
meat. General Lee's suggestion that an appeal be made to the
citizens to forward supplies is noted by this Bureau, and is not
approved. In conclusion, the only remedy for the present (but not
future) condition of things is an amendment of transportation, the
defects of which, with their inevitable result, have been repeatedly
pointed out by this Bureau from a period which dates as far back as
June, 1861. |
Respectfully, |
L. B. Northrop |
Commissary-General of Subsistence |
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