OR, Series 1, Vol. 51, Part 2, Page 674

{Endorsement on Lee to Seddon, January 26, 1863, Series 1, Vol. 25, Part 2, Page 598}
 
Subsistence Department
January 28, 1863
 
   Fifteen months ago this Bureau foresaw that the supply of cattle in Virginia would be exhausted, and initiated an arrangement to bring hither cattle from Texas to be put on the grass lands of Southwest Virginia and East Tennessee for future use. The drought of the country prevented it. The attempt was made and failed. The Secretary of War was asked early last spring to reduce the beef ration one-fourth of a pound, with an equivalent addition of flour, if required. This was done April 28. The meat has held out longer than was expected. On or about the same period the Commissary-General was sent for by the President to meet Col. A. Cole, sent by General Johnston to ascertain the sources of supply for the army, then about to fall back on Richmond. In conference with General Lee and the President the subject was considered and future prospects set forth. In respect to the contemplated operations after General Lee took command the Commissary. General of Subsistence urged the argument of subsistence as imperative. After the repulse of the enemy the Commissary-General of Subsistence urged the necessity of opening the northern districts of Virginia to the operations of this Bureau, and several times since General Lee was notified of impending want, so that it has been long understood. Last winter the Commissary-General of Subsistence urged that the necks and shanks of beeves, usually excluded by regulations, should be used so as to make the most of what was obtained. These significant facts must have prepared all persons to whom they had been stated for the present condition, which General Lee seems now to realize. In addition, the Commissary-General of Subsistence has endeavored to hold as much meat as possible for the army of Virginia, directing the chief commissaries of other armies and districts, that in view of the difficulties of transportation, and the lost and ruined condition of so much, and such fertile territory previously held by us, they must depend on their own districts as far as possible. Moreover, the Commissary General has, in this very view, refused applications for bacon, which would have been drafts on the stores at Atlanta, and has thereby incurred the strictures of the general commanding the Southeast. The present embarrassment is now due to the delay of railroads in bringing the bacon hither. For that this Bureau is not responsible, and it has often represented that some such catastrophe must result sooner or later from such course unless a remedy were applied. In respect to this particular instance, wheat was ordered weeks ago from Atlanta. Colonel Wadley was telegraphed on the subject, and the Secretary of War was addressed thereon, as he will remember, when the bridges on the Holston and Watauga were burned by the enemy; he was informed that a train of cars loaded with bacon had been left on the west side of the burnt bridges. Agents have been sent from here to hunt up and hurry on the cars, and the meat when started was placed in charge of messengers. This was done before General Lee's letter was referred to me. I had done all that was in my power, and on the day before the letter was referred to me I wrote to Lieut. Col. R. G. Cole, informing him of the railroad delays, so that he might use the influence of his position to prevent a repetition of what has several times crippled transportation, and which is said to have been lately practiced south of Richmond, to wit, keeping cars unemployed to meet expected removal of troops. When the meat will reach here I cannot tell, and I have been unable to hasten it by my efforts. The order of the War Department, dated April 28, reducing the rations of meat and increasing that of flour, as above referred to, has not been observed in the army of Virginia for a period of between three and four months, by order of General Lee, and the use of the whole beef (necks and shanks included), which was attempted to be instituted by the Commissary-General of Subsistence, has not been observed in that army, the discontent and other obstacles being urged as insurmountable in the field. At this post these things have generally been availed of. But for the violation of the above order and the failure to economize beef, the supplies for General Lee's army would have lasted several weeks longer. The orders of the Secretary of War to attempt to run the blockade from the Northern lines were attended to as soon as received. It has been impossible to organize a system as yet for want of suitable men, who have not yet been found, and when they are found they must report to General Lee, since without his protection they can do nothing. It may be as well for him to make that arrangement. One such party has been ordered already to report to him. Supplies cannot be gathered in the country southwest of General Lee's army. It has been or is being drained already. Nor can they be had on the south side of James River. That country is held tributary in commissary supplies to Petersburg and the south (except in hogs), and even if they were there (as they are not), in quantity to feed General Lee's army, they could not be had; neither time nor transportation will allow it. All the transportation that can be begged will be needed to get wheat to be converted into flour for the same army that now wants meat. General Lee's suggestion that an appeal be made to the citizens to forward supplies is noted by this Bureau, and is not approved. In conclusion, the only remedy for the present (but not future) condition of things is an amendment of transportation, the defects of which, with their inevitable result, have been repeatedly pointed out by this Bureau from a period which dates as far back as June, 1861.
Respectfully,
L. B. Northrop
Commissary-General of Subsistence

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