| Inspector-General's Office |
| Dept. of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana |
| Meridian, Miss. |
| December 29, 1864 |
| |
| Lieut. Col. E. Surget |
| Asst. Adjt. Gen. |
| Meridian, Miss.
|
|
|
| Colonel,
|
| In obedience to Special Orders, No. 226,
department headquarters, December 25, 1864, I have the honor to
submit the following report:
|
| The train {Mobile
& Ohio RR} arrived here from Mobile on
the morning of the 26th instant with 700 infantry and one four-gun
battery, known as King's battery, (on railroad without horses), the
whole commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Burke; the infantry armed, but
without ammunition. I drew from Major McCall, chief ordnance
officer, seventeen boxes of ammunition, and moved with all dispatch
with the train, as directed by the lieutenant-general commanding,
making every effort in my power to take the infantry and battery to
Corinth, Miss.
|
| I arrived at West Point at 5 p.m.
December 26, and placed myself in telegraphic communication with
Major Wheeler, commandant post at Okolona, and was informed by him
that the enemy had tapped the road at Verona, twelve miles north of that place, and was reported moving on
Okolona. I immediately telegraphed the lieutenant-general all the
information that I had received, and awaited his telegraphic orders
at West Point, which reached me about 9 p.m., ***. I was then ready
to move with the train, but a delay of about one hour was made by
the railroad agent in telegraphing, getting ready, &c. The train
got off from this point about 11 p.m. There being no water-tank on
the railroad between West Point and Okolona, I was informed by the
railroad agent that he would have to bail water in order to get to Okolona. I reported this fact to Lieutenant-Colonel Burke, commanding, and
he furnished a detail of soldiers for the purpose of bailing water.
|
| At 3 a.m. 27th instant I was again
informed by the railroad agent that he had not water enough to take
the train to Okolona, but could run to that point with the
locomotive, where he could get a supply of water, and return in time
to take the train to Okolona by 6 a.m. This proposition I submitted
to Lieutenant-Colonel Burke, and it met with his sanction. The
locomotive was detached, and I went on it to Okolona to get all the
information that I could as regarded the whereabouts of the enemy,
their strength, &c., as I had been able to hear nothing since
leaving West Point, though I had instructed Major Wheeler,
commandant of post, to send a courier five miles down the railroad
to give me any information that he might have of the enemy. No
courier was dispatched along the line of the railroad. I arrived at
Okolona at 4.30 a.m., and was there informed that the enemy were
encamped within five miles of the place, estimated at from 2,000 to
2,500 strong by the most reliable scouts that came in. Okolona being
in a broad, open prairie, affording no protection for infantry, and
finding that it could be approached by three roads, I thought it
best not to attempt any defense of that place. I then for the first
time learned that General Gholson was in front of the enemy with a
cavalry command, reported to me to be 190 strong, without
ammunition. I sent a courier to him immediately, telling him what
disposition I thought best to make of the troops under command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Burke, and asking a personal interview with him.
I waited one hour, receiving no reply from General Gholson. It being
then about the dawn of day, and not knowing how soon the enemy would
be in the town, and not receiving any reports from the scouts, I
caused to be moved about fourteen cars that were at the depot to
Egypt, which I was informed by the railroad agent were of more value
to the company than the defense of the track from that point to
Egypt. Had those trains not been removed at that time they would
have certainly fallen into the hands of the enemy. I returned to Egypt
on this train, where I reported to Lieutenant-Colonel Burke all the
information I had been able to get, and what I had written to
General Gholson relative to the best disposition I thought to make
of the troops, all of which met with the approval of
Lieutenant-Colonel Burke. Two hundred and seventy men were moved up
on train and placed in position on railroad two miles and a half
south of Okolona, where there was a bridge and trestle that could be
defended by infantry, that being the only point where there was any
timber or cover on the prairie close to the railroad. The train was
sent to report to Lieutenant-Colonel Burke, commanding these 270
men, to enable him to fall back on Egypt should the enemy make any
demonstration on either flank, at that time having heard nothing
from General Gholson. At 9.30 a.m. General Gholson came in person to
where the 270 men were in position, and he was informed by
Lieutenant-Colonel Burke and myself of the disposition that had been
made of the infantry. General Gholson then informed me that he had
250 cavalry, with which he could and was watching the movements of
the enemy, and would keep me posted as to their movements, but could
make no resistance, as he had not one round of ammunition for his
command. At about 11.30 a.m. the enemy were in Okolona, and General Gholson's command fell back on the position of
Lieutenant-Colonel Burke. I was at this time in Egypt
making disposition of forces, as directed by Lieutenant-Colonel
Burke. Lieutenant-Colonel Burke fell back on Egypt
that evening, and all the troops were placed in position to defend
the railroad at that place. At 10.30 o'clock that night the operator
informed me that General Gardner wished to communicate with me at
the telegraph office -- General Gardner being then at West Point,
and I at Egypt. He inquired of me the disposition that had been made of the forces
and the whereabouts of the enemy. I telegraphed him fully of the
condition of everything at that point. He replied that he would send
up immediately 500 infantry, with the supplies needed, on the train.
I then telegraphed him, setting forth the importance of the troops
being in Egypt at 5.30 o'clock on the morning of the 28th; that
General Gholson would be useless with his cavalry, as they had no
ammunition; their guns being caliber .54, and the ammunition drawn
at this place was caliber .58, the ammunition would not fit his
guns, consequently could not be supplied by me. There was, however,
found one box of ammunition, caliber .54, which was given by
Lieutenant-Colonel Burke to General Gholson on the evening of the
27th. I then telegraphed to General Gardner that I thought it
important to keep the train of cars at Egypt, as the enemy was
camped about three miles north of that place, and there was no
chance for the escape of these men, should they be overpowered by
the enemy, except by this railroad train. *****
|
| From that moment I gave the train over
to the charge of the railroad agent, who was then in the telegraph
office, instructing him to leave off several hundred pounds of beef
and one sack of salt, as the men were then without rations. I was
informed by the railroad agent, whose name I do not remember to have
ever heard, that he would move this train to West Point on the
arrival of the train from West Point, which he supposed would be
there about 5 a.m. 28th.
|
| The last telegram that I received from
General Gardner was about 12 o'clock that night. At about 3 a.m. I
again telegraphed General Gardner, telling him the importance of the
500 troops and ammunition being there by 5.30 o'clock to enable me
to supply General Gholson with ammunition. The operator at
West Point
replied that the train had left half an hour before, but that
General Gardner was not aboard. The distance being eighteen miles, I
thought it safe to calculate that it would arrive at Egypt
by 5.30 o'clock. What detained it I am unable to state.
|
| The fight commenced in Egypt
about 7.30 o'clock. I at that time was at the railroad train, half a
mile south of Egypt. The enemy moved between Egypt
and train; at the same moment charged it with another column. The
attempt was made to move this whole train, but it was found that
there was not a sufficiency of steam or power to move the whole
train and save it from capture by the enemy, who were then within
less than 300 yards of the train. There was a number of cars cut off
from the train, which enabled the locomotive to move forward and
make good its escape with the remainder of the train -- several
box-cars and flat-cars, which were loaded with King's battery. How
many cars were cut off I am unable to state positively, but my
impression is that there were seven or eight. I found that it was
impossible to impress horses for King's battery. King's battery was
on these platform-cars and fired repeatedly into the charging
columns of the enemy. About 8.30 o'clock, the train still not having
arrived from West Point, I concluded that the locomotive must have
been off the track, and moved this train up for the purpose of
loading the soldiers from one train on to the other, to enable me,
if possible, to re-enforce Lieutenant-Colonel Burke at Egypt. We met the other train a distance of four and a half or five miles
from Egypt. The enemy were then within one mile and a half of the train. The
infantry, commanded by Colonel Wier, was immediately formed and
moved up the line of the railroad, where they encountered the enemy
about one mile from where they got off the cars, in which they
repulsed the enemy; this being about 10.30 a.m. The enemy fell back
and reformed south of Egypt about two miles, leaving Colonel Wier
entirely cut off from all communication with Egypt -- Colonel Wier
occupying position about four miles from town with his command, the
enemy forming one line of battle north of the town, one east of
town, and one south, fronting Colonel Wier, between his position and
town. There being no longer any firing in Egypt, and it was evident
to Colonel Wier and myself that the enemy had undisputed possession
of Egypt (as they were then firing the railroad buildings), Colonel
Wier requested me to take the train and go back to where I could get
in telegraphic communication with General Gardner and inform him of
the condition of things. I found that the telegraph operator had
come on to West Point, and there I met General Gardner in person and gave him a detailed
account of all that had transpired.
|
| I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient
servant,
|
| Jno. S. Hope
|
| Assistant Inspector-General
|
|