OR, Series 1, Vol. 30, Part 4, Page 548

Office Chief of Subsistence, Army of Tennessee
Chattanooga, August 25, 1863
 
General Braxton Bragg
Commanding Army of Tennessee
 
General,
   I submit as briefly as possible the present supply of this army, and the resources upon which it has to depend for future subsistence.
   I have three depots subject to the order of this office, containing all the subsistence of the army, except as drawn for upon Majors Cummings and Wilson. After supplying the army to August 31, inclusive, I shall have on hand in bacon, salt beef, and lard, 900,000 rations: fresh beef, none; breadstuffs, 1,100,000 rations; rice and peas, 3,000,000 rations; sugar, 150,000 pounds; vinegar, 1,200,000 rations; soap, 3,000,000 rations; salt, 4,500,000 rations; molasses, 300,000 rations.
   In relation to rice, peas, soap, salt, and vinegar, there is no probable difficulty in the way of continued future supply, large stores still remaining in the rear.
   For breadstuffs, also, I have no fear. By Major Cummings and Major Wilson, in the article of flour, and by Captain Allen, of Columbus, Ga, in that of meal, this army can be supplied weekly with sufficient for consumption, without lessening materially the supply above mentioned.
   In the articles of bacon and beef, the prospects for a supply beyond October 1 are not merely uncertain, but gloomy indeed. I have only fifteen days' supply on hand after September 1. Major Wilson can only give this army semi-monthly 100,000 pounds of fresh beef and 20,000 pounds of bacon, being but about five days' supply in the month. Major Cummings reports, August 21, but 800,000 pounds of bacon on hand, the Army of Virginia to be supplied out of that, and his inability to feed this army longer than September 20 in meats. Since Major Cummings' letter was written he has sent to this army and that of East Tennessee 150,000 pounds of bacon.
   I inclose extracts from letters of both these officers of recent date, mentioning these painful particulars.
   The local resources of this country, except as embraced in the field of Major Wilson's operations, and in North Alabama, where my agents are yet doing good service, are entirely insufficient to supply our hospital posts, the officers of some of which are calling on me weekly and oftener for cattle to be sent them from the rear to feed their sick. From North Alabama I cannot expect to receive within thirty days more than 600 or 700 head--less than three days' supply. Major Sykes, from Somerville, Ala., it is true, reports the probability of yet procuring in North Alabama, in exchange for salt, 50,000 pounds of bacon; but that will be subject to Major Walker's order, as he alone can furnish the salt, and will probably reserve the bacon for the army in Mobile. Even if procured, when it reaches a post it will not feed the army two days. Any local purchases and exchanges that can be made by our detached troops will only compensate for wastage and loss in consequence of badly cured meat.
   These estimates are irrespective of any probable increase of the strength of this army. They are also based on the ration of one-third pound of bacon, an amount which I am satisfied cannot further be reduced without great dissatisfaction in the army, a dissatisfaction already mentioned by distinguished generals as existing, and to dissipate which will require such an address and explanation to the troops as will expose to the enemy the weakness of our resources and the probable consequences.
   Upon the whole, general, I can see no reasonable expectation to feed the army with meats beyond the last of September, and that only with the most rigid care and economy, except by immediate resort to the cattle of Florida and Southwest Georgia, as suggested by Major Cummings, and by a general impressment of all stock, except those reserved for breeding, that our cavalry can drive in. This last course, I understood from you this morning, would be ordered and may be of material use in extending the period of supply. The extent of a just reliance upon it remains to be seen. I can give no estimate even of what it might effect.
   I regret I can give no more gratifying account of the supply of the army, and the probable resources of the country.
Respectfully referring to the inclosed extracts, I am, general, your obedient servant,
Giles M. Hillyer
Major and Chief of Subsistence
 

First indorsement

Headquarters Department of Tennessee
Chattanooga, August 26, 1863
 
   This paper touching a matter of such vital importance is submitted for the information of the War Department. The morale of this army is being seriously injured by this cause principally, and desertions, some to the enemy, are not uncommon.
Braxton Bragg
General, Commanding

Second indorsement

Adjutant and Inspector General's Office
September 2, 1863
Respectfully referred to Commissary-General for report.
By command Secretary of War:
H. L. Clay
Assistant Adjutant-General

Third indorsement

Office Commissary-General of Subsistence
September 4, 1863
Respectfully returned to Secretary of War.
   Major Hillyer's statement of the condition, present and prospective, of the means for subsisting General Bragg's army, and the indorsement of the latter, are submitted for the information of the War Department.
   Extracts from letters of Majors Cummings and Wilson are sent as sustaining the positions. Many months ago communications from the commanding officers of that army and from the chief commissary were forwarded to the War Department containing similar information, with views of the unpromising prospect then existing in the country, which the Secretary of War it was very erroneously supposed had not been kept informed of. From the inception of hostilities the War Department has been fully and continually informed of the existing condition and future prospects of obtaining subsistence.
   The great dependence of the cotton States on the north and on the States of Kentucky and Tennessee, even for the articles of breadstuff and meat, including corn, has been urged; and from the beginning, so long as it was possible, supplies, to a large extent, have been obtained therefrom, gradually lessening as the enemy have advanced and occupied our territory.
   The records of this Department exhibit this: On the 27th of April, 1862, a circular letter was issued to the chief commissary of each army, a copy of which is hereby appended, showing the views of the Commissary-General.
   As the war has progressed these causes have increased and the results have become intensified, so as to be obvious to ordinary intelligence; and the prudential suggestions flowing therefrom have been continuously pressed on the War Department. In the fall of 1862 an elaborate statement of the whole situation submitted and occupied the attention of the Government for weeks.
   Finally, many secret contracts of various kinds, in which the proposers assumed success, were made to get meat from over the borders in many directions. The watchfulness of the enemy has foiled them all. Other arrangements to introduce meat via Europe, Bermuda, and Nassau have been pressed with some success, but small compared with the necessity; and a system of collecting all the food that could be obtained in our country established so complete that those who do not raise it for their own use fear they will find, in some instances, insuperable difficulty in supplying themselves, and the other departments requiring supplies, make such complaints, and the reduction of the meat ration has been several times pressed.
   General Bragg and his chief commissary, so far as these papers, indicate, seem to think that the statements of Majors Cummings and Wilson are necessary to convince the Secretary of War of the want now impending.
   General Bragg's indorsement states that the paper touching a matter of such vital importance is submitted to the War Department, and that the morale of his army is being seriously injured by this cause principally, and that deserters, some to the enemy, are not uncommon.
   General Bragg has fallen into a delusion. His army has probably many Tennesseeans and inhabitants of districts in Mississippi and Alabama which have been yielded to the enemy from the Mississippi east, and the loyal East Tennessee having entered the army, and perhaps also many lukewarm, if not disloyal, consider that their families are virtually in the hands of their domestic enemies. Those from the rest of Tennessee and North Alabama and Mississippi know that their homes are actually so. That army has been sufficiently fed to keep the men in good condition. Witness that of the Army of Virginia, on less, never was more healthy or efficient than last winter. But the causes above enumerated have been working, and will cause demoralization always, except only when troops are actively engaged in attempting to drive the enemy from their homes. Even without those causes an army of men having homes and families not well provided for will be demoralized, while an army with far less rations than his army has had, if operating actively, will not become demoralized.
   General Bragg admits serious demoralization in his army; he attributes it to the prospect of impending want of subsistence one month ahead; consequently his judgment of the true causes is legitimately contested by my judgment in support of a different explanation.  The reserves at Atlanta were intended for the east, it being justly supposed that the armies of the west and southwest could hold the country, which was amply sufficient to subsist them. General Bragg's army has chiefly depended on these reserves, and 125,000 pounds of bacon have recently been sent to General Johnston's army.
   For twice within two months the stores at Jackson, Miss., have been destroyed, to which I especially ask the attention of the Secretary of War.
L. B. Northrop
*****

Inclosure No. 3

Office District Commissary
Atlanta, August 21, 1863
   In your telegram you ask me to write you fully as to prospects, and I therefore respectfully beg leave to call your attention, and the attention of General Bragg, to the fact that my supply of bacon is being rapidly reduced, and I have not to-day exceeding 800,000 pounds all told on hand, and my shipments to Richmond average over 50,000 pounds per day, and my orders from Richmond are to ship all bacon on hand as rapidly as possible. In addition to my shipments to Richmond, I am making daily shipments to other points; therefore I estimate that within twenty days, thirty at the outside, from this time I will be entirely out of bacon.
   These are alarming truths and should be well looked to by those in authority. I have been and am still doing all I can, but feel that I have done about all I can do, and being restricted by orders and circumscribed in territory, I feel I cannot meet expectations, and have therefore determined to tender my resignation, but until accepted I will continue to do all I can.
   In regard to breadstuffs I have no fears. I can and will supply you, at least for some time to come, unless I am peremptorily ordered to ship to Richmond. Only a few days since I received an order from the Commissary-General of Subsistence directing me to ship as quietly and rapidly as possible all the wheat I had on hand or could accumulate to Richmond, over and above the absolute wants of the armies that were dependent upon me. I answered I could barely supply the requisitions of flour for the armies in my immediate neighborhood, therefore could not make shipments to Richmond unless specially ordered.
   In regard to beef-cattle, I have ordered everything I have in West Georgia driven in to you at once, which is being done as rapidly as possible. In Southwest Georgia I have a good many beeves, but for the want of transportation they are being brought out very slow. My agents in Southwest Georgia report that the principal part of the transportation is being taken for the use of the army of Virginia in transporting corn, therefore I conclude that the prospect for feeding the Army of Tennessee is quite gloomy. My agents in Florida write me that there is all abundance of cattle there, but the people are indisposed to sell them for our currency and drivers cannot be had.
   I this morning had a long interview with His Excellency Governor Joseph Brown, and frankly stated to him the condition of the commissariat, and the difficulty I had to labor under for drivers, &c., and did hope he would turn over to me 50 or 100 men from his State organizations for the purpose of driving cattle. My statement appeared to alarm him very much, and he at once telegraphed the President. A copy of his dispatch I herein inclose you, from which you will see there is not much to be expected from the Georgia State troops.
   I have no hesitancy in saying--from the reports made to me--that a great many cattle can be had in Florida by energy and a proper organization. The Commissary-General has authorized me to get them, but I can do nothing without men and assistance. I regret to have to make so gloomy a report, but the facts are as stated, and I thought it proper that you and the commanding general should be well advised of the condition of, affairs, and that you may be advised in advance. I must say I cannot supply you with meat for exceeding thirty days from to-day unless assistance is furnished me, and that promptly.
*****
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. F. Cummings
Major and Commissary of Subsistence

Inclosure No. 4

Richmond, April 27, 1862
Sir,
   In this letter I wish to call your attention to three things and to their bearings upon your duties:
   First. The lines of railroad transportation, always insufficient for the purposes of the Government, are comparatively worn out, and the most important have been broken by the enemy.
   Second. Appropriations of money made by Congress for the army have extended only from session to session.
   Third. Whilst the number of troops on the field has increased and will be still further increased, certain districts of large supply, as in Tennessee and several portions of Virginia and North Carolina, are wholly or to a very considerable extent in possession of the enemy. Various reasons besides the above-mentioned mode of furnishing money have hitherto forbidden large contracts in advance as the rule of this Department, and have made it necessary to supply by far the largest part of subsistence by current purchases. And now the partial, if not entire, exclusion of Texas from furnishing supplies on this side of the Mississippi River will require each section to be the-principal reliance for subsisting the troops within its own limits. In this aspect of affairs proceed at once to make yourself fully acquainted with the resources of your district, with a view to support troops now and with reference to future crops, and especially ascertain the prospect of obtaining corn-meal in adequate, prompt, and continuous supply as soon as it may be needed, and the number and capacity of the mills for grinding it.
   In consequence of existing and probable scarcity of meat, arrangement had been made to distribute molasses as a substitute for part of the rations of meat throughout the army. The loss of New Orleans, likely to be followed by that of the few points on the Mississippi River from which sugar and molasses can be carried to the interior, renders it necessary that you endeavor to limit the consumption of meat. Henceforth the rations will be a pound of beef or a half pound of bacon or pork, and the ration of flour or meal will not exceed a pound and a half of either.
Report the result of your investigation to this office as soon as possible.
L. B. Northrop

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