| Osyka |
| May 3, 1863 |
| |
| Lieut. Gen. J. C. Pemberton |
| Comdg. Department of Mississippi and East
Louisiana |
| |
| Dear Sir, |
| In obedience to Special
Orders, No. --, dated April 28, 1863, I repaired, at 9 p.m. of that
day, to the depot {of the New Orleans, Jackson
& Great Northern RR} at Jackson, supposing the train of troops to accompany me was ready to start.
When I got to the depot, I was chagrined and surprised to find that
the three companies of the Twentieth Mississippi Mounted Infantry,
who were to constitute a portion of the forces subject to my orders
in the movement projected against the enemy, with horses, were just
beginning to be placed on the train. |
| About 2.30 a.m., April 29,
1863, the men and horses were all aboard. I inquired for the
conductor, and learned that he was in bed at his chamber. I sent him
an order to get up and proceed with his train immediately, or I
would send for him a file of men. After a short time he came. He
then inquired of the engineer whether he could pull the train, who
replied that he could not, because there were too many cars in the
train. |
| The conductor and engineer
then said that three cars must be taken from the train. This was
done. Now they said they had not wood enough to run the train to the
next station, and they had no lamps. I inquired whether or not they
had an ax to cut wood; they replied they had none. About daybreak
they started with the train, and did not reach Hazlehurst until 11
a.m. In spite of all efforts, these men were churlish, and seemed to
be laboring to defeat as far as possible the movement of troops.
They claim their privilege of exemption from military service as
employes of the railroad company. It should not be granted to men
who are so unmindful of the public interests. |
| As we rolled into
Hazlehurst, a citizen approached us in an excited manner, and said
1,000 Yankees were within a quarter of a mile of the place,
approaching it. I did not much believe the report, but, as a measure
of precaution, I ordered the train to be run back on the road about
a mile. I then ordered the men to form on each side of the railroad,
and 20 horses to be taken from the train, and sent out a scout in
the direction of the reported advance of the enemy. The scouts
returned in a half hour, and reported the enemy not to be found as
reported. |
| ***** |
| I reached Greensburg
at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 2d of May, where I learned that
the enemy at great speed had passed the previous evening at about
sunset, and had crossed the Amite
River
at Williams' Bridge, which had not been destroyed. I sent a scout on
his track, from whom I learned that the enemy had crossed at
Williams' Bridge about midnight on the night of the 1st May, and had
stopped about day to feed and rest at Sandy
Creek, 15 miles beyond the Amite, and had gone on the road to
Baton Rouge. |
| From the best information I could get, the enemy's strength consisted of the Sixth and Seventh
Illinois Regiments of Cavalry, the pride and boast of the United
States Army, numbering in all about 1,100 picked men, well armed and
mounted. It was not his desire to fight. He wanted to make
observations, destroy railroads and telegraphic communications. It
is said he pressed horses, the best he could find, to mount his men
when a horse was jaded. He also captured mules and homes, negroes,
forage, subsistence, and stole money and jewelry from the people in
his course. He has made a most successful raid through the length of
the State of
Mississippi
and a part of Louisiana, one which will exhilarate for a short time the fainting spirits of
the Northern war party. |
| We may expect a repetition
of this raid on a smaller and a similar scale. We had forces enough
to have captured and destroyed him, but his movements were so rapid
and uncertain of aim that we could not concentrate our scattered
forces or put them in concert of action. You had assigned to me men
enough to have whipped him, but they were so scattered that I could
not find half of them until the enemy had entered his own lines.
While I had to pursue him, I could not do more than send out
couriers to find the commands ordered to report to me. I followed
him two days and nights with only 170 men, one day and two nights
with 270 men, and one day and night with 470 men. |
| While we failed to capture
or destroy the enemy, the movements on our side saved the railroad,
telegraph, and Government property from Summit
to Ponchatoula {stations on the New Orleans,
Jackson & Great Northern RR}, the southern extremity of our lines, and drove him
from the country with a loss on his part, by all his casualties, of
about 70 men. Having done the best possible for me, with the means
at my command, under the Special Orders, No.--, which you did me the
honor to make, I beg leave to submit the above report, not, however,
without saying that the soldierly qualities of Major [W. A.] Rorer,
his officers and men, never complaining, always ready for duty, and
anxious to meet and punish the foe, won my admiration. |
| R. V. Richardson |
| Colonel, Commanding Cavalry, &c. |
|