| From the Wilmington Journal |
| October 30, 1861 |
| |
| The Railroads |
| Yesterday morning a formidable
fleet sailed from Fortress Monroe. What may be its destination is of
course wholly conjectural ***** |
| In this state of things, it is
proper to look at the thing fairly and calculate all the
contingencies, for this is the course for safety. Suppose the enemy
should land in large force and there should be danger of his being
able to overcome all the obstacles in his way to Wilmington, what
policy ought to be pursued in regard to our railroads? |
| It is evident, on the least
reflection, that these roads would be our only chance to obtain
immediate reinforcements from the north or the south, and that their
being destroyed or disabled would be far more injurious to us than it
could be to the invaders. Burning down bridges would have the effect
of isolating us, cutting off our supplies, while the enemy would have
the sea open as the basis of his operations. If he attempts to
penetrate into the interior by those roads, he could be prevented,
without permanent injury to the roads, or lengthened delay to our
people coming to our aid. |
| We would suggest to all to
leave this matter to the authorities of the railroads, acting in
concert with the military authorities of the district. Let no
unadvised or spontaneous action of citizens lead to any burning down
of bridges or other destruction of the very means of our safety. By
having as little rolling stock here as possible, and by also having
arrangements to take up the track from as much of the road as might be
deemed necessary, and carrying the rails to some points in the
interior, the control of the road could be still kept in the hands of
their authorities, and these lines be used to bring along sufficient
reinforcements to crush any invading force before they could either
advance or fortify themselves. We have reason to know that all this is
fully understood by those who have the matter in charge, and they will
be prepared to adopt all necessary measures with the utmost
promptitude. |
| We look to a contingency that
may or may not occur -- a necessity that may or may not arise. We do
not regard it as sufficiently imminent to occasion any nervousness or
panic, but it is certainly not impossible, nor even so improbable as
to warrant our authorities in neglecting to provide against. it. |
|