NP, RW 1/5/1864

From the Richmond Whig
 
January 5, 1864
 
The Rail Road System
   Next to the currency, the most important question before  Congress is the efficiency of the army. The public credit is the very "sinews of war." That restored to sound health, the weapons of our defence -- our armies, and the agricultural and mechanical resources to supply them -- become the great subject for consideration. We must bear in mind constantly, that the war must be worked out as well as fought out. The detailing of the best overseers from service to superintend plantations, would no doubt accomplish incalculably more for the general welfare, by the increased amount of provisions that would result, than the services of the same number of men in the camp. An army of artizans also should be recruited and organized, who can contribute more to the good of the cause by their mechanical skill in the workshop, than upon the battle field. We propose only to submit at this time a few facts and suggestions upon the present condition and wants of our Rail Road System.
   The sufficient supply of our armies in the field at all times with food, clothing and munitions of war is indispensable to success. Without these, all military operations on an extended scale must inevitably cease. The basis of the transportation of such supplies is our railroads, forming, as it were, the great arteries of our country. Connected with these are those lesser distributing agencies, the field transportation, whose effectiveness depend, almost altogether upon the condition of the former. We are now drawing much of the supplies for our large armies from distant points. If our railroads are not kept up serious consequences must follow. Their present condition is scarcely less precarious than that of our currency. Some prompt and decided action must be taken in the one case as well as the other, or both will soon become worthless to us.
   The continued reduction of the rates of speed on our railroads, together with the frequent failures to make connections, is sufficient proof of their constant decline. Many of our Railroad Companies have apparently abandoned all idea of keeping their roads in repair, and are looking rather to rebuilding them after the war than to keeping them up during its continuance. And who can foretell the duration of the war? Nearly all our railroad supplies were formerly drawn from, or through the North. These cut off, some attempts have been made to obtain them from Europe. But these attempts have in the main proven failures, and the chances for the future from that sources are lessening daily. We have but one resource left, to produce them at home, and we must set to work at once to this end.
   The jealousies of rival roads and the selfishness of individual interests have thwarted all efforts heretofore for the accomplishment of a systematic co-operation in our transportation facilities. Some nucleus around which those who are disposed to act to the end could rally has been greatly needed. The Government perhaps only can furnish this nucleus. Rail Road companies should realize that the public interest vested in them is of too important a character to be trifled with. It would be impolite for the Government to interfere with private enterprizes when judiciously managed. But every such interest must yield to the public interest during the great struggle we are now engaged in. We do not propose that the Government shall interferer directly with the management or working of railroads, unless in extreme cases public interest demands it. But such action might be taken as to advise with, aid and suggest new modes of obtaining railroad supplies and operating advantageously. The present condition of our roads proves the necessity of such action. The prevailing mania for money-making has also seized them. They have all become rich and are in a measure out of debt. Their patriotism should now impel them to regard the public interest as the highest consideration. Whenever this is ignored the strong hand of law should be made to bear upon them.
   What, the, is to be done? Boiler iron, tire iron, wheels, axles, castings, &c., are needed in large quantities, and if not supplied within six months much of the rolling stock in the country will be useless. Rails must be re-rolled, cross-ties supplied, roads ballasted, &c. There is but little hope that these things will be done as things are now managed. By properly organizing and economizing the skill and labor of the country they can be accomplished. In addition to making efforts to secure such skill and labor from the country at large, judicious details from the army and a requisition for the able-bodied male negroes of the border counties of States now invaded would probably be a sufficient force. To direct this immense work, we suggest that a Railroad Bureau be formed. Had such a Bureau existed from the commencement of the war, our railroad would probably now be in fine condition, well supplied in every way, and ready to transport our armies promptly from point to point, for strategic purposes, at the rate of twenty-five miles and hour, instead of from five to eight. Who can estimate the advantages which would thus have been given us, moving on the shorter base? Nor would corn be now selling at one and two dollars in Southwestern Georgia and twelve to fifteen in Virginia. The valuable railroad stock recklessly destroyed would have been looked after and saved. New railroad iron would not have been converted into plates, &c., when old could have been obtained. How much could have been done it is useless now to surmise; how much may yet be done is a matter for Congress, by proper action, to show.
   The enemy, from the beginning, of the war, have based their hope of ultimate conquest in a great measure on the deficiency of our mechanical arrangements and ingenuity, and the consequent breaking down of our railroads and other internal improvements. It requires the consideration of Congress to foil their calculations in this as in other things. Our armies are the limbs of the body politic --  our means of defence; but our internal improvements and agriculture are the body itself.
   The Railroad Bureau which we propose should have an Inspector General, with the rank of Colonel or Brigadier General, as its chief. It should have four assistants, with the rank of Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel, as they ought to outrank the Presidents of rail roads, who, by act of Congress, rank as Majors. Each assistant should be assigned to a department of the Confederacy, with two clerks, ranking as Captain and Lieutenant. The departments should probably be as follows: 1st. Virginia and North Carolina; 2d. South Carolina, Georgia and Tennessee; 3d. Florida, Alabama and Mississippi; 4th. The Trans-Mississippi Department. It should be the duty of each assistant to be constantly engaged in inspecting the roads within his jurisdiction, and to visit each at least every three months; to make arrangements for receiving and disbursing railroad supplies, or for manufacturing them; to furnish cars, motive power and means of transportation to the Quartermaster's Department; and to make a quarterly report stating the condition of road beds, rolling stock and motive power, and the amount of the same in proper condition for services, to be sent to the bureau. The Inspector General should make a compilation of facts from these reports, to be returned to the War Department. The Secretary of War would in this way be always able to determine as to the practicability of transporting troops rapidly from point to point, and also supplies. What is now a complicated matter would be simplified and a marked improvement would doubtless soon be observed in the speed and punctuality in running the roads. The railroad companies, too, would be greatly benefited by this arrangement. Their interests would be fully represented in the Government, their grievances readily redressed, and harmonious action would be established among them. We trust this subject will not be overlooked  by Congress, but that this or some similar action will be taken upon it.

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