| From the Richmond Examiner |
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| July 30, 1861 |
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| The battle at Manassas was
well nigh lost by the laggardness of the Manassas Railroad Company in
bringing down a large column of infantry belonging to Gen. Johnston's
command. It would almost seem as if that company had timed the arrival
of the troops to be too late; and if the trains had not been stopped by
Gen. Smith before reaching the junction, that officer's Brigade cold not
have arrived on the ground, and the victory might have been lost With a
few honourable exceptions, the railroads of Virginia have exhibited a
criminal degree of inefficiency in the transportation of troops. "How
not to do it" seems to have been their study in all the business of this
war. The Northern roads transport with ease five or ten thousand troops
a day. The Virginia roads move fifteen hundred with difficulty, and
seldom more than a thousand. |
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| The wretched manner in which
the business of army transportation has been managed is an instance of
inefficiency in one department of administration which has characterized
all. The fatigue to the soldiers of the long journeys traversed has been
immeasurably increased by the meanness of the provision for their
comfort and the frequent transitions they have been required to make
from one train to another. The first of May ought to have seen a
continuous, unbroken line of railroad from the remotest city of the
South to Alexandria; that the soldier might embark at New Orleans and
traverse the whole distance to Alexandria or Norfolk without disturbance
of his rest or his comfort. But he has been subjected to changes at
every town, at all hours of the night, and been more jaded by a trip,
which should have been one of rest, than by a whole season's campaign
before the face of an enemy. Looking merely to the comfort of soldiers,
the cruelty of the thing is monstrous, and should call down upon the
guilty heady of railroad directories the curses of an indignant public. |
| The construction of
connections through cities of railroads terminating in their suburbs
would have obviated all this affliction to the wearied soldier. It would
have done more. It would have increased the capacities of the roads for
transportation from one thousand to five or ten thousand per day; and it
would have diminished the time of the journey by one-half. Besides the
annoyance, discomfort, fatigue, trouble and cost occasioned by
reshipping men and baggage from one depot to another, a mile or two
apart, the time consumed is as great as that of the whole passage over
any one of the roads. Yet all this wear and tear of the soldiers and
waste of time, has been allowed to go on by our imbecile railroad
managers for two months, when two weeks of work would have completed all
the connections in the cities. |
| Our Generals have called for
this thing; our regimental officers have implored it to be done; our
city councils, invoked by the public voice, have raised committees and
adopted resolutions on the subject; but those whose business it has been
made to do the work have left it undone, showing always, in a masterly
manner, " how not to do" their duty. |
| Every one can see that a vast
facility to the transportation of troops would be given by these
connections. The whole time of transferring troops and equipments from
one depot to another would be saved. When any great movement of troops
was to be made, all the roads would be commanded for the particular
route over which the movement was to be effected. If ten thousand troops
were ordered from Richmond to Manassas to take part in a great
engagement, the cars and engines for a thousand miles South could be
brought into requisition, and there would have been no excuse for delay.
When we consider the immense advantage under which they system of army
transportation now labours for want of these connections through the
cities, and the neglect of the proper authorities to construct them, we
are staggered by the irrepressible conviction that there is palpable
treachery at the bottom of the matter. |
| All told, including Johnston's
command, there were less than thirty thousand Confederate troops on the
field at Manassas on the 21st instant. Thousands of admirable troops
were making their way towards the point, under the pilotage of the lazy
railroad managers. The South ran the imminent risk of losing the battle,
probably with it independence itself, by the laggardness of the
railroads. The subject calls aloud for investigation. The evil is too
enormous to be longer overlooked. These city connections should have
been made long ago; they ought not to be delayed a single day. Exposed
as our coast is to attack at so many points, they present the only means
of concentrating our army against the enemy at any point in force,
especially the connection of the roads which terminate at Richmond. |
| The whole army at Yorktown
could be transported in a day o Manassas or Fredericksburg, or vice
versa, if necessity should require it. In this manner, our army
could be given the faculty of ubiquity, and could be put down at
Charleston, at Savannah, at Goldsboro, at Alexandria, at Richmond, at
Norfolk, upon the York River, or where ever the enemy might show himself
in strength, or at whatever point we might choose to make a rendezvous
for aggressive demonstration. Equally for defence and offence, the
facility of locomotion afforded by these connections would be
invaluable. And yet, with all the palpable and unspeakable advantages
that would result from them, the authorities having the subject in
charge have not yet taken one step in their execution. |
| We trust, if the work is not
done speedily, the Confederate Government will take it in hand, and,
without delay or deference of any sort, will cause the work to be
executed promptly, thus taking care "that the Republic receive no
detriment" from local negligence, imbecility and treachery. |
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