| From the Richmond Dispatch |
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| August 26, 1864 |
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| In moving by his left upon the Weldon
railroad {the Petersburg RR}, Grant has
merely continued the maneuver which he commenced at the Wilderness
last May, and has never abandoned from that day to this. He has at
last reached a position from which he may give us some trouble by
operating on the Danville railroads {the
Richmond & Danville and the Piedmont RRs} through parties
of raiders, if our leaders should relax their vigilance, which we are
well assured that they will not do, and if that road itself be not in
a defensible condition, which, we are assured, it is. Apart from the
danger to be apprehended to the railroad in question, we do not see
that he has approached any nearer his object than he was before the
battle of Sunday last. He is actually farther off from Petersburg, and
the chances of isolating it are no greater now than they were then. By
extending his line, he weakens it, of course, and renders it more
liable to be attacked at a disadvantage. Though he could permanently
cut us off from all communication with the South, he could not affect
our supplies in any great degree; and that he cannot do, even though
he should take and permanently hold the Danville railroad. Of itself,
the Weldon railroad has, for some time past, been of little or no
practical value to us. |
| From a very remarkable article in the
Enquirer of yesterday, we learn general truths which ought to set at
rest every apprehension which the public may entertain with regard to
the consequences likely to result from the occupation of the Weldon
railroad. Our true communication with the South the writer of that
article says, and says truly, is beyond the reach of Grant, his army,
and his gang of thieves that go by the name of raiders. If the
Danville railroad be cut, the communication of the South with
Lynchburg still remains intact {the South Side
RR}, and it may be extended to Richmond by the canal and the {Virginia}
Central railroad. But we are not so dependent on the South for
provisions as the Yankees imagine. The harvests of the James and the
Rivanna rivers, and of the Valley, have been abundant, and are all
gathered in. Though the communication with the South were entirely
destroyed, there is still an abundant supply for the subsistence of
our armies. The Yankee idea of starving us out, and forcing us to
abandon our positions by tearing up railroad tracks and cutting the
bridges, is not only preposterous of itself, but has been to them the
source of enormous loss in men, horses, artillery, and the materials
generally of war. In the meantime, the railroads thus torn up are
repaired before any serious inconvenience can arise from the want of
their services, and long before the army would be in a starving
condition, were it even solely dependent on them for supplies. This
was demonstrated beyond the possibility of a mistake during the
current summer, after the raids of Sheridan and Hunter. The repairs on
the Danville road were completed in nineteen days, and those on the
Central within the same space of time. The repairs on the Lynchburg
and Tennessee road {the Virginia & Tennessee
RR} were pushed and finished with an energy and expedition
which have in them something portentous. In the raid of May,
twenty-three bridges — among them the bridge over New river,
eighteen hundred feet long and sixty feet high — was burned.
Although the timber with which this bridge was repaired was, at the
time of its destruction, growing in the woods, the materials were
provided and the work executed in nineteen days. When, in the middle
of June, Hunter made his raid, he flattered himself that he had done
the work on this road effectually. "The work of
destruction," says the Enquirer, "was thoroughly organized.
Brigades tore up the track, mechanics, detailed and provided
with tools for the purpose, piled, burnt, and destroyed the cross-ties
and rail with as much system as had been employed in the construction
of the road. They destroyed every bridge from Lynchburg to Salem, a
distance of sixty miles, and rendered it necessary to replace from
fifteen thousand to twenty thousand cross-ties. The rails
had been heated, bent and twisted, and were straitened and replaced.
The timber for these bridges and cross-ties, as well as for
wood-sheds, and water-tanks, and other necessary structures, was
growing in the woods when the raid occurred. The enemy had destroyed
four thousand lineal feet of bridging. One of these bridges was nearly
eight hundred feet long and sixty feet high. The whole of these
repairs, except the principal bridge, was finished in nineteen days,
and the road was in running order from Lynchburg to Bristol within
less than sixty days from the day of its destruction." |
| We make this quotation, not only to show
what energy and enterprise can do, but to prove that our communication
with the South, by means of the Danville railroad, cannot be destroyed
as long as raiding parties are the only dependence for destroying it.
Permanent occupation is the only thing that can effect it, and we
hardly think that possible just at this time. Even should the High
bridge on the Southside railroad be destroyed, a temporary road could
be made around the track, or the Danville railroad could be reached
from the Southside by a road from Farmville to Keysville. Much anxiety
has been felt with regard to the existence of railroad iron in
sufficient quantities to repair these roads as they are broken up; but
it need no longer be felt. Steps have already been taken at Lynchburg
for re-rolling old railroad iron, and no doubt similar arrangements
will be made here and elsewhere. In a short time, railroad iron may be
made abundant, at least for all the purposes of war. |
| For most of the facts here stated we are
indebted to the article in the Enquirer, supposed to have been written
by an eminent citizen of Virginia, long distinguished by his thorough
knowledge of the resources of the State and his zeal in the cause of
internal improvement. We hail the opinion that our railroads cannot be
long kept out of use by means of raids, as the more important, because
we believe it is supported, if it was not originally inspired, by men
of the largest experience and the highest practical ability. That is
the only element in the question of Grant's present position which
need give us the slightest uneasiness. If he cannot disable the
Danville railroad so as effectually to cut us off from the South--if
he cannot cut us off from the South even by disabling the Danville
railroad effectually — and if he cannot starve out our army, even
though he should cut off our communication with the South,--then we
have nothing serious to apprehend from his late movement. It takes him
out of the low grounds of the Appomattox and places him in a healthier
position. That is something, but it is all. It does not give him
Petersburg, nor does it advance him in his progress towards its
capture. |
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