| From the Georgia Telegraph (Macon, Ga.) |
| |
| December 19, 1862 |
| |
| {From the New York Herald, Dec. 8th] |
| Military Campaigning by Rail Roads |
| In another column will be
found an interesting letter from Washington foreshadowing important
exposures of the intrigues of the radicals against General McClellan
during the time that he was in command of the forces at Washington and
on the peninsula, which finally resulted in his removal. -- It also
furnishes some important facts and practical suggestions in reference
to the experience of our armies in relying upon railroads as a medium
to obtain their supplies while marching into an enemy's country, to
which we call the attention of our readers. |
| The facts there stated in
regard to the result of relying upon railroad communication to furnish
supplies for the army on the peninsula over the short distance from
the White House, on the Pamunkey to the Chickahominy, also the
experience of Pope, with a much less force, in attempting to obtain
his supplies over the Orange & Alexandria railroad throw a flood
of light upon the events of the past year. They also furnish our
readers some idea of the immense sacrifice of life and treasure, which
the intrigues of the radicals at Washington against General McClellan
have brought upon the country in their vain and fruitless efforts to
ruin McClellan and prove themselves great Generals. -- We have here
also the facts showing that the railroad from the White House to the
Chickahominy, a distance of only twenty miles {on
the Richmond & York River RR}, was, when well stocked with
engines and cars, inadequate for the transportation of supplies for
the army, forcing the artillery and cavalry horses to subsist a great
deal of the time on half allowances of forage. On the other had, it is
also shown that Pope, with a much less force, was unable to obtain at
Warrenton, one-third the distance to Richmond, sufficient supplies for
his troops before he was joined by the Army of the Potomac. These
facts are also borne out by the statement of Prince de Joinville in
his review of the Peninsula campaign, where he states that an invading
army in this country can not safely march over two or three days from
their base of supplies without water communication. |
|