| Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Company |
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President's Office |
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Richmond, May 31st 1863 |
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Hon. James A. Seddon, Secretary of War |
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Sir, |
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Permit me to respectfully but most earnestly to invoke your
attention to the probable attempt of the enemy to cut off the supplies
and compel the retreat of Gen Lee's army from a direction and in a mode
not heretofore attempted, if ever heretofore contemplated. |
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Reflection has so confirmed my apprehension of the
probability of their making this attempt that, although it is Sunday, I
cannot refrain from addressing you this morning on the subject; least
the delay of one day may make it just too late to prepare
for & frustrate their designs. I do not mean to arrogate to myself any
special military foresight or sagacity -- far from it --; but special
knowledge of the country, and of the dangers to which these bridges are
exposed, with a less divided attention to the subject, may well suggest,
what may be overlooked by the ablest and most vigilant mind occupied
with the multifacious and important affairs, engaging your thoughts and
those of General Lee. The danger apprehend is this. At any unexpected
moment of day or night -- perhaps within the next 24 or 48 hours,
a force of cavalry, mounted infantry & light artillery may be crossed or
landed at Port Royal, Port Tobacco or other neighboring point on the
lower Rappahannock, sufficient in numbers & munitions to overpower the
small force without artillery now guarding only two of the
bridges on this road; and by a rapid movement drive off our small force,
destroy all these bridges, and escape to the lower Rappahannock
or York Rivers, before it would be possible to prevent the insuperable
mischief, or even overtake and punish them. Port Royal & Port Tobacco
are distant respectively from the R. Rd. bridge over the
Mattaponi only about 15 & 17 miles, and from the North Anna &
South Anna Bridges only about 25 & 30 miles respectively.
Any of these distances may be passed over by such an expedition in from
three to six hours of night, marching, especially with the
advantage of a full moon now existing, such as lighted them on their
last expedition, and much closer & better roads. It may be said that
they would be deterred by the apprehension of being cut off from their
retreat upon Port Royal. But this could be easily avoided by a rapid
march -- recruiting fresh horses as formerly from each farm
on their route -- to Tappahannock or Urbanna on the Rappahannock, or to
West Point on the York, where they are already fortified. If in such
force as they can well afford to spend, they might perhaps, encouraged
by their former success & discovery of the condition of our forces here,
attempt to enter Richmond on their route. |
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If I might presume to make any suggestion as to the
precautions against such a disaster, I would not propose to detach any
considerable force, to guard any of these bridges on their sites. But a
force of cavalry, mounted infantry & light artillery somewhat similar to
that, from which such an expedition might be expected, might be posted
at some point between the Railroad and the Rappahannock, not further
North than Bowling Green, with a double chain of strong reliable
cavalry videttes extending down & parallel to the Rappahannock as far as
Tappahannock at least. While this force warred by these videttes of the
Enemy's movements would be in a position, to intercept any such
expedition on either side of the Railroad, they would be near enough,
when not so employed, to render any necessary aid in any general
engagement near Fredericksburg or on the Rapidan. |
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A careful perusal & comparison of the official Reports of
the Federal Army, and of the other publications in the Northern Press &
the rumored movements of the enemy's forces leave each day strengthened
and confirmed my conviction, of the probability of this attempt and I
conclude by again invoking your prompt attention to it. |
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I have the honor to be with high respect |
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Your obt Servt |
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P. V. Daniel Jr. Presdt &c |
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P. S. Perhaps a patrolling force of exempts might be organized and
employed in a short time to relieve the regular army cavalry of this
vidette duty. Indeed would not some aid &every arrangement from
Government to the organization of such forces in every county exposed to
incursions of the Enemy be expedient? |
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{on back of document} |
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Noted |
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JAS |
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