|
Adjutant and Inspector General's Office
|
|
Richmond, June 13th 1861 |
| |
|
Genl. J. E. Johnston |
| Commanding &c &c |
| Harpers Ferry, Va. |
| |
| Sir, |
| The opinions expressed by Major W. H. C.
Whiting in his letter to and on which you have endorsed your
concurrence, have been duly considered. You had been heretofore
instructed to exercise your discretion as to retiring from your position
at Harpers Ferry, and taking the field to check the advance of the
enemy. It is to be inferred from the papers now transmitted, that you
have considered the authority given, as not equal to the necessity of
the case; that you must needs retire before the enemy was present or
otherwise, that you would be unable to avoid capture and would not be
permitted to fight in retreat. In all the directions which have been
given you, you will not have failed to perceived, that relying equally
on your sound judgment and soldierly qualifications it was intended that
you should judge of the necessities of your condition and of the means
best adapted to answer the general purpose of the campaign. As the
movements of the enemy could not be foreseen, so it was impossible to
give you specific directions, and the cause of the country could only be
confided to one who, like yourself, was deemed entirely competent to
decide upon events as they arise. We have no reliable information that
the enemy is at Cumberland and had hoped that he could not so soon be
able to reach that point. We had not anticipated that he could turn your
position without your being appraised of it in time to make your
movements conform to that fact. As you seem to desire however, that the
responsibility of retirement should be assumed here and as no reluctance
is felt to bear any burden which the public interest require, you will
consider yourself authorized whenever the position of the enemy shall
convince you that he is about to turn your position and thus deprive the
country of the use of yourself and the troops under your command to
destroy everything at Harpers Ferry the bridge across the Potomac,
platforms and tressel-work included, which could serve the purpose of
the enemy, and retire upon the railroad
{Winchester & Potomac RR} towards Winchester, carrying with you
all the rolling stock and destroying the road behind you. Should the
people of Winchester and the surrounding Valley, rally to your aid in
such numbers as to enable you to resume active operations you will avail
yourself of the first opportunity to attack the enemy and endeavour to
drive him from his purpose of invasion, and to do as much else as
possible. The ineffective portion of your command, together with the
baggage and whatever else would impede your operations in the field it
would be well to send without delay to the Manassas
{Gap Rail} Road. |
| Should you not be sustained by the
population of the valley, so as to enable you to turn upon the enemy
before reaching Winchester, you will continue slowly to retire to the
Manassas road, upon some of the passes, of which it is hoped you will be
able to make an effective stand, even against a very superior force. To
this end it might be well to send you Engineer to make a reconnaissance
and to construct such temporary works as my be useful and proper. |
| The position of Harpers Ferry, as has been
heretofore stated is deemed valuable because of its relation to
Maryland, and as the entrance to the Valley of Virginia, the possession
of which by the enemy will separate the Eastern and Western sections of
the State from each other, deprives us of the agricultural resources of
that fertile region and bring in its train political consequences which
it is well believed you cannot contemplate without the most painful
emotions. If, therefore, much reluctance has been exhibited to a
retirement from your position you will not fail to appreciate the
motives which have led to it. Should you move so far as to make a
junction with Genl G. T. Beauregard, the enemy would be free immediately
to occupy the Valley of Virginia, and to pass to the rear of Manassas
junction, so that unless the proposed attack upon Alexandria should be
promptly successful you would soon be cut off both from reinforcements
and supplies until an army could be sent large enough to defeat that
before which you had retired, and you know too well our condition to
render it necessary you should be informed that this could hardly occur
front & rear. |
| Troops are now coming forward from the
Southern States, and it is to be expected that within a week Genl.
Beauregard's position may be reinforced by troops equal in number to
that which is reported is the effective portion of your command. If you
have until then covered the valley of Virginia, Genl Beauregard may thus
with more probable success advance upon Alexandria than by the junction
of your command with his by surrendering the valley of Virginia to the
enemy. It is not expected that you will believe that more number will
give you strength, yet it is hoped that the people fighting for their
homes and their liberty's with even a small number of instructed troops
may enable you to operate successfully against such forces as are
opposed to you, and it is but justice to add that the greatest reliance
is placed upon your capacity to inspire others with the soldierly
qualities you have so often exhibited and that the most unlimited
confidence is reposed in you both as a commander and a patriot. For
these reasons it has been with reluctance that any attempt was made to
give you specific instructions and you will accept assurances of the
readiness with which the freest exercise of discretion on your part will
be sustained |
| Very Respectfully |
| Your Obdt. Servt. |
| S. Cooper |
| Adjutant & Inspector General |
|