The Construction of the Selma & Meridian Railroad

The Construction of the Selma & Meridian Railroad

Rapid travel from the Richmond/Columbia/Wilmington/Charleston eastern side of the Confederacy to the Memphis/Jackson/New Orleans/Trans-Mississippi western side was obviously of great importance to the new nation. One side had the factories and seaports and the other had the strategic vulnerability of the Mississippi River. The River had to be defended and, if control of it was lost, the enemy had to be met somewhere in the west and stopped.

Initially, only the Memphis & Charleston Railroad performed this east-west connection. But it was clear to all who looked that the Western Tennessee/Mississippi/Alabama/Eastern Louisiana area could not be properly defended with just a single line of rail. This weakness became obvious to everyone when the Memphis & Charleston was broken immediately after the Battle of Shiloh. By early June, 1862, Memphis, Corinth and New Orleans had all been lost – an efficient way had to be found to support the army in Mississippi.

Among the many railroad projects being worked when the war began, there were two that directly touched the new imperative – the Meridian to Chattanooga line and the Vicksburg to Montgomery line. Both would fill holes in long distance travel needs for the war and the future. The first was being built by the Northeast & Southwest Alabama Railroad, connecting to the Wills Valley Railroad that was headed southwest out of Chattanooga. The second line was being built by the lower leg of the Northeast & Southwest Alabama Railroad, the Alabama & Mississippi Rivers Railroad and the Western (of Alabama) Railroad. The Western Railroad made little progress in a difficult environment.

The Northeast & Southwest Alabama road had the money and the rail to complete only the first half of the first leg of its projected 207 miles, being the first 13 of the 27 miles from Meridian, Mississippi to Reagan, Alabama (today’s Cuba). Plenty of additional rail was in New Orleans warehouses, but was lost when the city fell in April, 1862. The Alabama & Mississippi Rivers Railroad had not let the start of hostilities stop its construction toward Reagan. In September, 1861, the road’s President was in Richmond, discussing the need of the road for fish bars and bolts (to connect bars of rail where they met). He also informed the government that his road required $150,000 loan to complete the road before the war ended. In December, the Alabama Legislature passed a bill allowing the road to borrow from the State the $40,000 that had been intended for the construction of the Selma & Gulf Railroad.

In late November and early December, Major William S. Ashe, Superintendent of Military Railroad Transportation and President of the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad, wrote President Davis about certain railroad connections that were needed by the Confederacy. Both letters included the Selma to Meridian connection and both letters were attached to Davis’ letter to the Confederate Congress regarding railroad matters for them to consider. Congress responded with a request that the Secretary of War inform it of the amount of money required for the projects, and was told, on January 20, 1862, that $150,000 was needed to finish the Selma to Meridian road. Three days later, the President of the Montgomery & West Point Railroad, Charles T. Pollard, in making a case for money and iron to complete the Western Railroad from Montgomery to Selma, stated that the Meridian to Reagan section of the entire line would be completed by March 1^st and the Selma to Reagan would be finished by the 1^st of October, if that road could get the money and iron.

On February 15, 1862, Congress passed a bill authorizing the President to loan the $150,000 to the Alabama & Mississippi Rivers Railroad to complete the Selma to Meridian road. The Northeast & Southwest Alabama Railroad was not mentioned in the correspondence or the bill, though its completion was not assured without more iron.

Nothing appears to have happened until April 1^st, when the Quartermaster General, Colonel A. C. Myers, telegraphed G. G. Griffin, President of the Alabama & Mississippi Rivers Railroad, to come to Richmond immediately to work out the details of the loan to his road. Then, on the 4^th, the Secretary of War, George Randolph, appointed Abner S. Gaines to assist, coordinate and expedite the completion of the Selma to Meridian connection. Gaines was about 30 years old and had been in railroad construction for twelve years, most recently with the Mobile & Ohio Railroad (which ran through Meridian).

Secretary Randolph informed Gaines that some of the iron needed by the Northeast & Southwest Alabama Railroad for their potion of the connection was in New Orleans and held up by the New Orleans, Jackson & Great Northern Railroad being under army control and that the Secretary would issue instructions to get their iron transported. An April 7^th Act of Congress stated that the duty due on some iron in New Orleans being purchased by the Alabama & Mississippi Rivers Railroad would be “remitted,” provided the iron was used solely for the Selma to Meridian connection. It is possible that both sets of iron were in fact the same shipment, but it did not matter, since the iron had not been shipped by the time New Orleans fell on April 25^th.

James L. Price, a member of the Board of Directors of the Alabama & Mississippi Rivers Railroad Company, was sent to Richmond to negotiate with the Government. Negotiations started on April 10^th with Price submitting a document stating that the railroad had stated a need for $150,000 to finish the road back in August, but conditions had changed. Now the price of iron had risen greatly and the road’s shareholders could not pay their assessments because of the blockade preventing them selling their cotton. As a consequence, the need was now $500,000, not $150,000. The need for increased funding was not accepted by the Secretary of War and instructions regarding the securities needed by the Government before furnishing the $150,000 were detailed to Price on April 16^th.

On April 24^th, Gaines submitted an extensive report to the Secretary on the condition of the road and the securities and mortgage being offered. He contended that they were sufficient and, as soon as the mortgage could be certified in each of the four counties through which the road ran, he would send the entire package to the Secretary and hoped he would accept it and provide the funds. He noted that the President and Directors had appointed him co-engineer with their Engineer in Charge of Construction and authorized him to issue orders as necessary. Gaines also noted four miles of iron available from the Cahaba, Marion & Greensboro Railroad which he felt could be had easily. On May 12^th, Gaines wired the Secretary that the Navy Department had seized the Cahaba iron and requested the Secretary to authorize Gaines to retain it for the railroad project. The Secretary so ordered the next day, by telegram.

The hunt for iron took a side route when, on April 19^th, William J. Ross, General Superintendent of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, reported to General Beauregard that iron for the Selma to Meridian connection could be had by seizing and removing a lot of T-rail belonging to the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad and now in Memphis. Beauregard sent his thanks to Ross and stated that the iron would be sent to Vicksburg as soon as transportation could be obtained. While the iron may have been taken and sent to Vicksburg, it does not appear to have made it to the Selma to Meridian job.

The mention of the iron and the Selma project had a second effect. On the day after the note from Ross, Beauregard ordered Quartermaster Major John W. Goodwin detached for special duty and charged him with the construction of the railroad connection between Meridian and Selma, giving him authority to hire and impress slave labor along the line of the railroad. Ten days later, he had two reports showing almost 4,000 field hands along the line of the road and in the possession of men who had not shown significant support of the war. There are no records indicating whether they were hired/impressed, but it seems likely that the railroad company was able to hire many of them.

There is no record of any interaction between Gaines and Goodwin. It is clear that on June 28^th, the President of the Alabama & Mississippi Rivers Railroad contacted General Braxton Bragg to report his pleasure with Major Fleming (Superintendent of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad) and noted that Major Goodwin was favorably known in the country. The telegram appears to be a reply to an inquiry by Bragg regarding the road’s need for a military man’s assistance. Bragg immediately sent the telegram, without comment, to Secretary Randolph. The Secretary’s reply, if there was one, is not known. Major Goodwin was removed from the project and assigned to General Bragg’s staff as Military Superintendent of Railroads on July 17^th.

It is likely that the issue of who the Government’s man on site would be had come up because of the iron issue. It seems likely that Goodwin had gone to Mobile, looking for iron, and had learned from Brigadier General Forney that the Alabama & Florida (of Florida) Railroad was no longer needed and its iron should be used elsewhere. Forney had already removed some of the rail and moved it up the road to prevent its capture by Union raiders, now that Pensacola had been abandoned by the Confederate army.

Goodwin must have let it be known that he needed the road’s iron and intended to get it. But the Superintendent of that road, O. M. Avery, had objected to Secretary Randolph on May 26^th and detailed several other sources of iron that could be used. The Secretary then telegraphed these additional sources of iron to Gaines and ordered him to investigate them before touching Avery’s road. Gaines’ reply was that some of the iron proposed was old and too light weight for his needs and that he had not made any moves on Avery’s road, that it must have been Bragg’s agent who had said such (i.e. Goodwin).

Additional fuel was thrown onto the fire when, on June 6^th, the Alabama & Mississippi Rivers Railroad formally informed Secretary Randolph that it had obtained all the iron in its reach and now needed to get some of the production from the new iron works being erected in Shelby County, Alabama. This company would be happy to comply with the railroad’s needs, but all of its production was contracted for by the army Ordnance Department. The Secretary was asked to allow some of the production to be directed to its needs.

Then, on June 16^th, L. J. Fleming, Superintendent of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, telegraphed Secretary Randolph that Bragg had assigned him to complete the Selma to Meridian. He needed money and one of Tredegar’s spike machines and an employee to work it, both to be assigned to the Shelby Iron Works. He said that Gaines was working with him and providing every assistance. The Secretary replied that the contract was between the Government and the railroad company and it was unnecessary for Bragg to assign anyone in conflict with the contract. If the railroad wanted his assistance, they could ask for it, but he would be working for the railroad, not the government. Fleming replied the next day that he was out of the picture, Gaines was perfectly competent to carry out his assignment and the road could not be finished with the funds presently allocated by the Government.

To keep the pot boiling, Gaines reported to the Secretary the same day, June 20^th, that Captain P. H. Thomson had just arrived from General Bragg with orders to take military control of the project and complete it and was in the midst of making arrangements. The result of several telegrams and meetings was this: the railroad did not yet have its $150,000 because the papers they had sent to Richmond had not arrived and a replacement set was being sent by messenger; the company would finish the project under their contract or under military control, as the Secretary desired; Thomson’s orders were suspended and he had returned to Bragg’s staff. Thus, everything returned to the condition when Gaines had been assigned.

But just when it appeared that everything was back on track, Bragg wrote General Cooper in Richmond that the company could not finish the road. Within a couple of days, Secretary Randolph had given the control of the project over to General Bragg. On July 4^th, Bragg had received the agreement of Samuel Tate, President of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, to assume the general superintendence of the project. While impressment of labor and materials was not desired, the urgent need for the completion of the road would be the guiding rule. On July 10^th, General Cooper informed Bragg that the government was fully aware of the importance of this road, but seizing the road was not legal and would cause serious harm to the attitude of the people.

By July 12^th, Tate was in Demopolis and had requested the Governor of Alabama to exempt the slaves within ten miles of the railroad project from drafts to build fortifications. No reply has been found. Enough slaves were hired to make good progress until mid-September, when Tate had to publish a notice that if slaves were removed from the work without approval or if slaves ran away and were not replaced, he would not pay for the work the missing men had done. On October 1^st, Gaines telegraphed Secretary Randolph asking for permission to impress slaves to make up for those being withdrawn by their owners. Randolph replied that it was not legal for the government to impress slaves, but he would contact Alabama Governor Shorter for his assistance. However, before the Governor had to take public action, the railroad reported that enough slaves had been returned or hired to continue the work.

Gaines had reported that he had taken from the Cahaba road enough iron to complete about three and a half miles of track. Much more iron was needed and Tate looked to the Alabama & Florida (of Florida) Railroad to supply it. Despite the objection of that road, the Secretary of War authorized Tate, if it was absolutely necessary, to take their iron for the connection.

It was necessary and on July 12^th, Tate took possession of 2,838,000 pounds of iron (rails, chairs, spikes and frogs) from that road, 1,189,000 pounds from the Montgomery & Eufaula Railroad. On September 10^th, an additional 2,459,000 pounds were taken from the Cahaba, Marion & Greensboro Railroad. Two-thirds of the total of 6,486,000 pounds was used on the Alabama & Mississippi Rivers Railroad and the other third went to the Northeast & Southwest Alabama Railroad. The construction materials provided by the Government had required about 360 car loads, just for the iron. The rails provided were 50 and 58 pounds per yard T-rail.

The Florida iron was shipped over the Mobile & Great Northern Railroad to Mobile, then by steamboats to Mobile and then up the Mobile & Ohio Railroad to Meridian. The Montgomery & Eufaula iron went from Montgomery to Selma by steamboats. The last shipments of iron appear to have arrived in Meridian about October 4^th.

The new connection opened with a trial run on December 10^th and full service shortly after. New rolling stock had been difficult to find and the road was unable to operate at full capacity because of it. The road never saw its Tombigbee River bridge completed during the war. A four mile steamboat ride was required to connect, further reducing the capacity of the road.

Construction on the bridge was still in progress long after the war in the east had ended. Bids had been called for on February 1, 1863. The bridge would be a Howe truss of 470 feet length and a top chord draw of 90 feet in the clear. There were to be three stone piers and two abutments, requiring 6,000 pieces of first class bridge masonry. A mile and a half of trestle work, varying from ten to twenty feet in the air would lead to the bridge. Completion was scheduled for December 1, 1863, was delayed by heavy rains, lack of labor and lack of iron until 1866.

Even with the boat ride, the new schedule saw passenger travel from Meridian to Selma accomplished in eleven hours for the 120 miles.

The Northeast & Southwest Alabama Railroad leased its 27 miles, probably for five years, but it is unclear whether it was the Southern (of Mississippi) Railroad or the Alabama & Mississippi Rivers Railroad that got the lease. An early version of the lease had been negotiated by the President in early 1863, but it was rejected by the Board of Directors and the President was directed to make a lease with either of the two roads that met the ends of the road.

The completed connection, renamed the Selma & Meridian Railroad in early 1865, was broken by Sherman’s raid on Meridian in February 1864 and by heavy rains and flooding in February 1865. Each disruption was repaired in about four weeks.