The Construction of the Piedmont Railroad

The Construction of the Piedmont Railroad

Richmond and the Army of Northern Virginia drew on three sources for supply. The easiest was the local Virginia production of iron, coal, salt, lead, copper, wood and food. Iron and food came from the Valley of Virginia primarily by way of the Virginia Central Railroad. Salt arrived from Saltville, in the far southwestern part of the state, along with lead, on the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad and then either the South Side/Richmond & Danville Railroads, by the Virginia Central Railroad or by the Lynchburg to Richmond James River Canal. Copper came from the southeastern corner of Tennessee and used the same routes to Richmond, after starting on the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad. Coal was produced within twenty miles of Richmond and arrived by the James River or the Richmond & Petersburg Railroad. Wood and food was produced throughout the state and was provided to Richmond by numerous railroads and the James River Canal. Unfortunately for the Confederacy, the Virginia sources were not sufficient to supply the industry and the very large number of soldiers and civilians that the war brought to the state.

Additional supplies for Richmond used two routes. The western one collected freight from the central Confederacy in Atlanta and forwarded it through Knoxville and on to the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad route detailed above for salt. This supply line was limited by the hostility to the Confederacy in eastern Tennessee and the very limited amount of rolling stock on the East Tennessee & Georgia and the East Tennessee & Virginia Railroads. Local bridge burners and cavalry raids made this route unreliable until it was permanently broken by General Burnside’s capture of Knoxville in the fall of 1863.

The eastern route to supply Richmond was up the eastern side of North Carolina and Virginia. Traffic funneled to Weldon, North Carolina from Charlotte, Raleigh and points south and from Wilmington and points southwest. Both routes drew from the Columbia-Charleston area and from Georgia via Augusta or Savannah. The Charlotte route was safe from enemy interference, but the eastern one was close enough to the Union army forces in the North Carolina Sounds and Norfolk/Suffolk that it could be broken if the Union wanted to make the effort. The single line from Weldon to Petersburg (the Petersburg Railroad) was absolutely essential to maintaining the Confederate position in Virginia.

The obvious weakness of the main supply line, running so close to places that the Union could easily and quickly reinforce by sea and use as launching points for an attack on that line, made Confederate leaders decide early on to support the construction of a connection from Greensboro to Danville to provide an interior line of supply. This Piedmont Railroad had been a desire of eastern Virginia and the Richmond & Danville Railroad since 1848. However, it was hated and feared by the powerful men of North Carolina since it would certainly draw western North Carolina traffic into Virginia, rather than use the North Carolina Railroad to the newly created seaport of Morehead City. This loss of traffic on the North Carolina Railroad would make it difficult to make that road profitable and able to pay off its construction debts.

The war, however, forced North Carolina to agree to the construction (after fighting it for months). The usual Confederate problems quickly surfaced – lack of labor and lack of iron for the track. The road would go through a section of the state that had slaves, but not in large numbers. Most Southern railroads were built almost entirely by local slave labor, so this shortage of slaves to draw from was a serious issue. To remedy it, the new railroad advertised for planters from the coastal area to send their slaves to work on the railroad, far from Union incursions and sanctuaries. This tactic helped, but the road was seriously short of labor throughout the war.

The need for fifty miles of track highlighted the South’s most serious problem with new railroad construction – the lack of iron and iron works. There were essentially four sources of iron for the Confederacy: the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond and its iron mines in the Valley of Virginia, the Atlanta Iron Works and its iron from southeastern Tennessee, the Selma Iron Works and its mines in the future Birmingham area, and the railroads that already existed. All three iron works were short of skilled workmen, short of coal and short of iron. The Army claimed most of the production for artillery and other needs, the Navy claimed most of the remaining production for its artillery and for the iron necessary to build its ironclad warships. It appears that Tredegar produced only one batch of T-rails just before the war and Selma produced five miles of flat bar for its own use late in the war. Since no rails were imported, if railroad iron was required for any purpose, it could not be made and would have to be taken from existing railroads.

The determination that a railroad could be dispensed with and its iron taken for more important use was certain to draw the wrath of the stockholders and the elected officials of the state down onto the man making that determination. Using a familiar technique, the government determined that the Army’s Engineer Bureau would make the decisions, and the Engineer Bureau decided that it needed a separate body to make the determinations. Thus was born the Commission for the Removal and Allocation of Railroad Iron in June, 1863. Initially composed of an Army Engineer, Captain George E. Walker, and a well-known railroad engineer, Charles F. M. Garnett, it surveyed candidate railroads and made recommendations to the Secretaries of War and Navy, through the Chief of the Army Engineer Bureau.

The first railroad designated to provide its iron to the new Piedmont Railroad was the Roanoke Valley Railroad. This road had twenty-two miles of poor condition track draining a fertile tobacco region of southeastern Virginia down into North Carolina. It was clearly of no use to the government, so its iron removal was easily decided upon. The railroad’s president reported that he did not have the power to sell the iron to the government and the government replied that the iron was therefore impressed and removal began in June, 1863. Over time, the following railroads had some of their iron taken to provide track for the Piedmont: the Atlantic, Tennessee & Ohio, Atlantic & North Carolina, Blue Ridge, King’s Mountain, Norfolk & Petersburg, Raleigh & Gaston, Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac, Richmond & Petersburg, Richmond & York River, Seaboard & Roanoke, South Side, Virginia Central and Western North Carolina Railroads. Note that this one project required iron from fourteen railroads, and few of them could really afford to contribute any of their rail without loss of efficiency.

The Confederate Congress passed an act to provide for the connecting of the Richmond & Danville Railroad to the North Carolina Railroad on February 10, 1862, two days after the North Carolina Convention incorporated the Piedmont Railroad. On February 12^th, the Richmond & Danville agreed to construct the road as quickly as possible if the government provided one million dollars (or as much more as was required) and the iron for the rails. Before the end of the month, the Secretary of War had directed the Engineer Bureau to provide an officer and support to lay out the two contending lines for the new railroad.

The possible routes for construction were: a direct line from Danville south to Greensboro and a line from Barksdale Station on the Richmond & Danville Railroad south to Milton, North Carolina, Yanceyville and a point on the North Carolina Railroad near that road’s headquarters near Graham. The routes were of about equal length, but the Barksdale route would require a significant bridge over the Dan River and the bridge would delay completion of the road.

The line recommended by Capt. E. T. D. Myers, who laid out the line, was the Danville – Greensboro route, which would require 760,000 cubic yards of excavation and the construction of 765,000 cubic yards of embankment, along with masonry work and second class bridges. The work would require 2,500 hands and 500 carts and horses. The estimated cost was $972,000 and would require about six months. On April 30, Capt. Myers was ordered to construct the road. The contract between the government and the Richmond & Danville Railroad Company, dated May 6, 1862, called for the government to provide a million dollars in bonds as a loan which would not require interest from the Company until eighteen months after the railroad was completed (the Company actually received the bonds on January 16, 1863). One week later, the Directors of the Richmond & Danville Railroad, which had purchased all the stock of the Piedmont Railroad, ordered the immediate construction of the road. On June 17, 1862, Capt. Myers placed his first advertisement in the newspapers for the hire of slaves, mules and carts. On June 23, the Engineer Bureau provided 500 shovels to the project.

The first work appears to have started about June 1, with a number of axemen and surveyors working to lay out the exact line of the road. On June 2 and June 24, Capt. Thomas R. Sharp, who was about to open the Confederate Locomotive Shop in Raleigh, drew lots of tools from the Richmond Quartermaster specifically to repair locomotives for the Piedmont Railroad, as directed by the Secretary of War. By July 15, a Quartermaster Captain, William R. Johnson, had been assigned to Capt. Myers to control and account for the materials and funds provided by the government. At this point, if appeared that the railroad might be completed in the anticipated six months. But by the end of September, eighteen slaves had run away from the work, an issue of security that would contribute to the low number of slaves on the job for many months, as owners were unsure that the Company or government were doing enough to protect the planters’ property.

On October 4, the Chief of the Engineer Bureau reported to the Secretary of War that Capt. Myers now believed the road would require one or two years more to construct, in the current conditions. The Bureau asserted that they would work with Capt. Myers to speed up the work in any way possible. At the same time, the Danville newspaper reported that the first mile of grading had been completed and a large number of hands were working on the job daily. Nevertheless, advertisements appeared in numerous newspapers to get more hands. The holder of the grading contract, Edmund Wilkes & Brothers, was under contract, since September 3, to finish the grading by May 1, 1863.

A Richmond newspaper reported on October 22, that only 400 hands were at work where 2,000 could profitably be used and called for owners to hire out their hands for this critical work. Advertisements show an increase in offered rates from $10 per month in early September to $22 per month in mid-October. The railroad reported the lack of hands to Congress that same day. General Lee joined the chorus a few days later, calling the new railroad “absolutely essential to us in the operations of the ensuing campaign.” He foresaw an enemy attack south of the James River and strenuous efforts to cut the communications with the South by taking the Petersburg to Wilmington railroad line. He obviously had his eye on the Federal lodgment in the North Carolina Sounds and the likelihood that General Burnside would advance up the Roanoke River to the railroad line.

Despite the pressure and increased wage offerings, it would be eighteen more months before the road was in operation.

On November 10, the Secretary of War requested North Carolina Governor Z. B. Vance to provide 1,250 laborers and 500 mules from his state, while Virginia was being asked to provide 650 laborers and 100 mules. He specifically noted that the planters on the Roanoke River should have hands available. The Secretary noted that the company had 800 hands on the job and was seeking to hire another 400 on its own account, but the hands he was seeking would be in addition to what the company would provide. The Governor’s response was that the new road was of great importance and he hoped the government would speed its work, but he was not willing to draft North Carolina slaves to work on the road. Virginia did, evidently, allow the drafting of hands, with Henry County agreeing, on December 17, to provide 225 hands.

The Chief of the Engineer Bureau, Colonel J. F. Gilmer, sent to the Secretary of War an evaluation of the contract signed by the railroad company and Mr. Wilkes. He determined that the contract was extremely generous to the contractor, required the government to provide very large amounts of support, and did not identify a firm completion date. He proposed that, if the government felt it was an emergency, the government should take charge of ½ of the length of the road and complete it, while assisting the contractors in completing the other half. Before deciding on whether to accept Col. Gilmer’s proposal, the Secretary of War asked for a statement of what assistance was being provided the contractor at present. The answer was that 1,700 tools had been or would be provided, enough to supply the hands the road was attempting to obtain. Quartermasters were also seeking to obtain mules and carts near the construction site.

By November 27, the government had determined that it would not take over part of the construction project. Col. Gilmer sent to the Richmond & Danville Railroad and Piedmont Railroad President and Directors a formal statement of the support the government would provide – tools, carts, mules and food. Since the government had only planned to use two additional officers of its Engineer Corps, the refusal to take on the construction of half of the railroad could not be because of lack of resources, but must have been a refusal to violate a philosophical belief in the proper role of government in the economy. That belief was that the national government should not be involved in public works. This belief caused the government to justify all public works jobs during the war as “military necessities.” Though the Piedmont Railroad was definitely a military necessity, the argument was not applied to it in its early phases.

The need for labor remained as serious as the question of iron. In early February, the Secretary of War again wrote Governor Vance of the need for North Carolina’s government to assist in obtaining the required labor. On the 12^th, he repeated his refusal to supply any assistance in procuring slaves for the construction. He made it clear that he was a politician and would not cross the people of influence in the state (the ones who had built the North Carolina Railroad and also the ones who had the slaves in question). He did, however, offer to allow half of the free Negroes of North Carolina to be called up for the work.

Not surprisingly, when the Engineer Bureau asked for such a call from the Secretary of War a few days later, and he issued it, Governor Vance became indignant at the Confederate government making such a call without getting his prior approval. The fact that it had been the Governor’s own suggestion that was being acted upon did not matter – the Secretary of War humbly asked the Governor for his permission to call up the free Negroes.

In August, 1863, George H. Hazlehurst, a railroad builder and President of the Wills Valley Railroad in Georgia, offered to provide a gang of 1300 hands for the Piedmont project. There was great enthusiasm on the Piedmont and government side, and after Mr. Hazlehurst’s visit to Richmond and Danville, some arrangement was made, the details of which are unknown.

Labor was so hard to procure that on October 14^th, the Quartermaster General ordered the Post Quartermaster at West Point, Georgia, to provide transportation for forty slaves and one overseer to Greensboro, North Carolina, by way of Columbia, South Carolina as though on government account (though the Piedmont Railroad would pay the cost). This was a trip of 600 miles to get forty hands.

In an effort to stay ahead of the construction requirements, Col. Gilmer asked Capt. Myers whether he wanted the iron that the government would be providing to be sent to Danville, the north end of the new road, or Greensboro, the south end. Myers replied that forty miles of iron was needed at Danville first, then eight and a quarter miles should be sent to Greensboro. Since the Richmond & Danville Railroad would be the source of support, it was clear that construction would begin at Danville and head south. This would cause the northern section to end at what became Rudd Station, now part of Greensboro.

By the 26^th of December, Col. Gilmer had determined nine railroads that could provide iron for the Piedmont and sent the list to the Secretary of War. On January 7, 1863, Col. Gilmer forwarded to Capt. Myers the list of railroads that had been designated by the Secretary of War to surrender fifty percent of their un-laid iron – Western North Carolina, Raleigh & Gaston, Atlantic & North Carolina and the Virginia Central. Three railroads would surrender their laid iron in certain places – all of the Roanoke Valley Railroad, the Port Walthall branch of the Richmond & Petersburg Railroad, and that part of the Richmond & York River Railroad beyond the Pamunkey River. Capt. Myers was urged to appoint energetic agents to secure this iron immediately, as the enemy was threatening the main lines of communication and the Piedmont Railroad might become vital.

Nine days later, Col. Gilmer requested the Secretary of War to order the Quartermaster General to immediately undertake the collection and transportation of the iron on the various railroads. This need for the Engineer Bureau to request the Quartermaster Department to provide the labor for the removal of the iron shows a weakness in the plan that would not be solved for some months – the Quartermaster Department would have to find men to run the removal of iron that was in use on various roads and transport it. At this point, the Quartermaster Department had no relation to the railroad problems, except as a consumer of railroads’ services.

The head of the government’s railroad office was Col. William M. Wadley, located in the Adjutant & Inspector General’s Department. Wadley was an exceptionally able railroad man, but he was in the wrong department to be able to meet the transportation requirements of the armies and of the Quartermaster Department – and he had an office of exactly two men, himself and Captain Frederic W. Sims. With problems of rates, assignment of rolling stock, relations between railroads and commanding generals and dozens of other issues, he was completely unable to provide the service and direction that the nation’s railroads needed. The first proven time that Col. Wadley was contacted about the Piedmont Railroad construction was in late March when Col. Gilmer was directed to him to solve Gilmer’s request for a narrow gauge locomotive to assist in the construction of that road (the parent Richmond & Danville Railroad being 5’ gauge). Wadley had not been involved in the new road’s route or gauge, the roads that would have to provide iron for its construction, or any other issue that should have been in his purview.

The organizational issues would only be resolved when, in June, Congress refused to confirm Wadley in his rank and he departed government service, and when, in July, Capt. Sims was promoted to Major and moved to the Quartermaster Department. Railroad issues were becoming so severe and complex that during the first month after Wadley left, Sims was able to get two efficient subordinates assigned to him, one in North Carolina and one in Alabama and Mississippi. But even with the changes, it was October before Sims became involved in the Piedmont project.

The question of finding and removing iron for the country’s government-required railroad projects and naval armor moved forward in June when the Engineer Bureau got agreement from the Secretaries of War and the Navy to form a commission to identify, remove and allocate railroad iron. The Iron Commission immediately became a major player in the story of the Confederate railroads.

The first rails laid on the Piedmont Railroad were placed in early March, 1863, when Capt. Sims was requested to provide a locomotive to assist in track laying. This would be about two months after Capt. Myers had been given instructions to secure the identified rail as quickly as possible. The first shipment of rails to the Piedmont Railroad appears to be that of iron removed from the eastern end of the Richmond & York River Railroad, with the first shipments arriving in Richmond in mid-April. Another shipment of 1 ½ miles of track and 800 chairs was received from the Blue Ridge Railroad, in South Carolina, in later May. A shipment from the Seaboard & Roanoke Railroad was reported in Petersburg in late August, with five miles being sent to the Piedmont Railroad.

Another shipment was a load of Roanoke Valley Railroad rails in Petersburg in October. Since the road was being taken up as early as July 1^st, it is certain that some rails must have been in Danville for laying by late July, though a shortage of flat cars for transporting the rails was noted in mid-July. A request to detail Private A. Saunders, 25^th Battalion Virginia Volunteers, a skilled track layer, had been made in mid-February and on March 4^th, President Harvie reported that track laying had been started.

By August 8^th, 274 tons of rails (about three miles) had been removed from the Roanoke Valley and a bill for them presented to the government. With chairs, castings, rods and a switch stand, the bill came to $62,380, and was paid by Capt. Myers that same day. By the 29^th, Capt. Myers had written the Engineer Bureau for assistance in expediting in every way the shipment of iron to him for laying, implying that he was ready to lay more iron than he was receiving from the Iron Commission and the Roanoke Valley.

Capt. (now Major) Sims ordered Major J. D. Whitford, the Railroad Bureau officer in North Carolina, to send two and a half miles of track each week to Petersburg for forwarding to Danville. This would require about twenty-eight flat car loads each week, the cars making a 400-mile round trip for each load. How much actually got shipped on this schedule is not fully known. On October 2^nd, the Petersburg Railroad was paid for freight on five miles of track, plus chairs and spikes, requiring some fifty-five cars. On November 1^st, the President of the Raleigh & Gaston Railroad reported that he had delivered almost nine miles to Weldon and the Petersburg Railroad was ready to haul it to Petersburg.

On March 26, 1864, the Engineer Bureau paid another $407,000 to the Roanoke Valley Railroad for iron, meaning another 20 miles of track had been delivered. On March 30, A. H. Hopkins, the Iron Commission Agent who had been in charge of removing all of the rail, reported that the locomotive to pull the load of rails over the North Carolina Railroad to Greensboro was too weak to pull the load. This would have been part of the eight and one quarter miles that Capt. Myers had directed be sent to Greensboro after all the previous iron had been sent to Danville. Agent Hopkins reported the end of his employment three weeks later, having been on the job from July 1, 1863 to April 15, 1864.

The required rolling stock to run on the new railroad was almost as difficult to find as the labor and iron to build it. The first locomotive, for track laying, had been requested in later March, 1863. Col. Wadley had reported that he could not provide such at that time. When he did find a locomotive for the road is unknown, but two prizes of war, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad locomotive number 226 and the locomotive Exeter, captured in June, 1862, were sold to the Piedmont in early June, 1863.

In August, the issue of a request for another locomotive and more flat cars came up again. The Engineer Bureau advised the Iron Commission to consult with Capt. Sims about providing the road with a locomotive and flats from the Roanoke Valley Railroad.

The rolling stock came up again on September 1^st when the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad requested a locomotive to speed grain shipments on the Tarboro branch of that road. Sims noted that this issue was significant, but far less so than the question of providing a complement of rolling stock of the Piedmont Railroad. He maintained that the new railroad would be of little value if sufficient rolling stock could not be provided and such rolling stock was not available in the 4’ 8 ½” gauge the North Carolina legislature had mandated. The Secretary of War was again requested to ask that state to allow a gauge change to 5’, at least until the end of the war. By the 16^th, Colonel Rives was advising the president of the railroad to visit the Secretary of War at once to urge the gauge change requirement on him.

By September 20, 1863, the loss of Knoxville and the closing of the western route to Richmond caused General Lee to write President Davis of the critical nature of the defense of Weldon and the line of supplies through the eastern route. He mentioned the small progress on the Piedmont Railroad as the reason that Weldon must be fortified and secured.

Lee would have been at least somewhat pleased to learn that tracks had been laid from Danville fifteen miles toward Reidsville. About eight miles remained to reach the only real town on the road between its two ends. It was anticipated that the road would reach Reidsville in mid-October. The first depot had been sited, eight miles south of Danville, and named Pelham, in honor of Major Pelham, who had been killed in battle in the spring.

Among the less mentioned items needed for a railroad’s construction was cross ties – the wooden supports upon which the rails rested. The distance between ties was closely related to the weight the rails could carry and how quickly the rails would deteriorate under use. Ties were usually provided by contractors who worked teams of slaves to cut, saw and transport them to the line of the road. During the war, contractors, mules, and slaves were all in short supply on all Southern railroads, but the shortages were particularly important on new construction. To meet the needs of the tracklaying team, Capt. Myers asked authority to impress ties, but on September 30, the Secretary of War refused to permit that authority with the rationale that it was for a company and not for the government. Such curious rationale is used several times related to this railroad’s construction.

At the end of September, Capt. Myers reported the Quartermaster goods that he had provided to the Piedmont Railroad during the previous quarter. The main items were corn, 60,000 pounds; oats, 6,000 pounds; and hay/fodder/shucks/straw, 130,000 pounds. It would have been impossible for the railroad to have found, purchased and transported this quantity of essential goods on its own when it would have had to act in competition with the government purchasing agents.

In early October, the captured Baltimore & Ohio Railroad locomotive number 226, a 30 ton engine made by the Denmead Company, had made a test and public relations run on the completed portion of the road. Wearing the Confederate name of “General Robert E. Lee,” the locomotive carried officials and newspaper reporters from Danville to Reidsville and returned with full cars of citizens taking their first ever train ride. The test was a success and freight business started in less than a month. Passenger service started to Staceyville, sixteen miles from Danville, on the fifth of November.

On November 5, George Hazlehurst advertised in the Macon newspaper for 100 hands for the Piedmont Railroad. He specifically called for train hands and axemen and also noted that ten miles remained to be graded. He anticipated that the hands called for would be needed for five months, though they could be returned to their owners at the end of 1863 if the owners desired such an arrangement.

Capt. Myers placed his own advertisements in various North Carolina newspapers in December, looking for two hundred men, with rates of $52 per month. Grown boys and overseers were wanted and a fee of $10 per head was offered for any force collected and delivered to the Company. Capt. Myers was offering employment for the next year at this, the normal time of year for businesses to hire hands for the following year.

In mid-November, the Greensboro newspaper reported that tracklaying north had just started; completion was presumed to be in a few weeks. It was also noted that the Manassas Gap Railroad had moved their shops to Greensboro, had leased their rolling stock to the Piedmont road (four locomotives and forty cars) and would be maintaining the rolling stock of the Piedmont in Greensboro. Unfortunately, the Superintendent of the Manassas Gap Railroads said no such offers or arrangements had been made.

Iron rails became an issue again on November 20, when Capt. Myers reported to the Engineer Bureau that tracklaying had stopped for want of rail. On January 16,1864, President Harvie reported a shortage of rails, and yet again on February 12, February 18 and March 14, when six miles of iron still remained to be provided.

The Piedmont announced the running of freight trains from Ruffin’s Station, sixteen miles from Danville, starting November 23. Freight cars were few and there were no station buildings at Ruffin’s or Reidsville, and, until they were completed, the freight would be shipped at the owner’s risk.

On December 3, the Greensboro newspaper noted that rails had been laid as far south as Reidsville and laying had commenced in Greensboro headed north. The government was transporting supplies from Greensboro to Reidsville by wagon, where they were loaded on cars for Danville. A reputed completion of the road about July 1^st seemed to be unreasonably distant.

The road announced daily passenger service from Danville to Reidsville (22 miles from Danville), commencing December 21^st. The trip was scheduled to take two hours, requiring an elapsed speed of 11 miles per hour.

Freight was clearly moving up the road at the start of the new year. Major S. B. French, of the Commissary Department, reported that fifty-four cars of food had arrived in Danville from Greensboro in the previous four days. This would require one train of fourteen cars per day, some 112 tons of food in each train, which would require between sixty and seventy-five wagons of food from Greensboro to Reidsville (the connecting point to the trains). In the winter rainy season, this was probably a good result at the start of the use of this line of supply. Richmond should still have received food from the Weldon/Petersburg line of railroads during this time, but Richmond was reported to be without any food stocks at all. It was clear that the Piedmont Railroad was needed in completed and efficient operation as soon as possible.

The Confederacy’s lack of manpower was demonstrated once again on February 22, when the Engineer Bureau ordered Capt. Myers to plan defense works for Danville to protect it from Union cavalry raids. Capt. Myers and President Harvie were not happy with this diversion of his effort from the completion of the railroad. The laying out of a plan would require at least a week or two on the north end of the road, while the main effort of work was on the south end.

The March 3, 1864 Greensboro newspaper reported that the rails were now laid for five miles north of the city. Unfinished grading was down to six miles and rails remained to be laid on eighteen miles. They also noted that the telegraph line was being moved to run along the track, improving the telegraph’s reliability.

Two days after the newspaper article above, the Engineer Bureau notified Capt. Myers that about a mile of track had arrived in Petersburg three days before and that the Richmond & Danville Railroad Superintendent had been notified of that fact. A load of rails from the removal of Union rails east of Fredericksburg, on the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad were expected in Richmond within the next three days.

On March 25, President Harvie reported that the road could be finished by April 15, if the government could provide the rail. On April 1, the Secretary of War ordered General Pickett, commanding in Petersburg, to support a force of engineers that the Secretary had sent to remove six miles of rail from the north end of the Charlotte to Statesville railroad (the Atlantic, Tennessee & Ohio Railroad) to be immediately used on the Piedmont construction. An additional two miles were at Gordonsville, awaiting transportation.

An unbalance of resources developed in April. On the 22^nd, Engineer Bureau chief Col. Rives suggested that the excess of iron on the south section and the excess of ties on the north section could be even out by using one-half of the 100 wagons hauling freight across the gap in the rails. He requested the Quartermaster General cause this diversion in the use of the wagons and estimated that only three days would be needed to even out the imbalance. The demand for corn, however, prevented the use of wagons to haul iron north, though some wagons did haul ties south, since they would have been empty in that direction.

To further speed up the remaining tracklaying, the Secretary of War authorized Capt. Myers to impress ties and tracklaying hands from the Richmond & Danville Railroad. Everyone was aware that the spring campaign would start in Virginia any day and the necessity for the Piedmont’s freight capacity was critical to supporting Richmond and the army when the fighting started. To provide some of the rolling stock required for that capacity to be realized, the Manassas Gap Railroad offered to lease rolling stock to the Piedmont Railroad, with rates to be determined later by a board of arbitration. This offer was made on the day that the Union Army of the Potomac began its long expected move south toward Richmond.

On May 7, Col. Rives, of the Engineer Bureau, reported to the Secretary of War that he had personally inspected the road and found it well sited and as rapidly constructed and the condition of the country and the times would allow. Four and one-half miles of track remained to be laid and trains would start running between May 20 and 25. With no labor force under the control of the Engineer Bureau, he saw no way to increase the speed of the remaining work.

Heading north toward Danville, the grade of the road was as severe as sixty feet to the mile. This would have been reduced if there had been enough hands to do more grading, but nothing could be done about this now. The grade would be a problem for the small and the tired locomotives available for use on the road and would limit the number of cars that could be pulled north in each train.

Though not yet complete, the road was contributing to the war effort. The Quartermaster General informed General Lee’s Chief Quartermaster that three trains that had been intended to carry corn to Danville for forwarding to his army had been taken to carry troops. The Battle of the Wilderness was demanding the utmost in effort, but the Army of Northern Virginia and Richmond were cut off from the rest of the South – Knoxville was in Union hands, the Richmond & Petersburg Railroad was broken, the Petersburg Railroad to Weldon was broken, and the danger from Union cavalry was so great that the Richmond & Danville Railroad was holding trains to prevent their possible loss.

But only a few days later, on May 18, the Quartermaster General telegraphed to the Quartermaster in Charlotte that the Piedmont was not receiving as much as it could carry. He was ordered to ensure that enough was on hand in Greensboro to prevent the loss of capacity. But on the same day, complaints surfaced that there was insufficient water available on the line to keep the locomotives supplied. Both were just growing pains on a rushed and urgent project, but they still limited the freight forwarded to Richmond.

The next day, the Quartermaster General telegraphed the Quartermaster in Greensboro that President Harvie promised to complete the track that night and trains would run through the next day. He was ordered to press everything forward. But two days later, the road was blocked up carrying troops (a total of 7,500 soldiers would pass up the Piedmont during this month); the Quartermaster General informed Charlotte and Greensboro that troops must go the long way, through Raleigh, Weldon and Petersburg, and only freight was to use the Piedmont route.

On May 25, with troops going on the Raleigh route, the Quartermaster General informed Greensboro that the Richmond & Danville Railroad was only able to put twenty-five cars of freight into Richmond each day. The Greensboro Quartermaster was ordered to put at least twenty-five cars of freight into Danville every day. This would mainly be composed of corn and fodder for the horses, medical stores, food for the troops and ammunition; everything else would go through Weldon.

Not only was the Piedmont providing an additional line of supply, it was also providing a shorter line to Richmond. By way of Raleigh, the trip from Charlotte to Richmond was 356 miles; by way of Danville, the same trip was 282 miles, a savings of 74 miles, but with two gauge changes, rather than one. The other big savings was in time – from one to three days saved using the Piedmont Railroad.

After the road opened for freight, improvements continued for months – siding were built, ties were added, and stations were completed. By August 15, the road was able to advertise that it would take freight from along the road or private freight as space remained after government freight was accommodated, though such space would only be available if the government system was failing.

On September 8, the Quartermaster General informed the road that since construction was now completed, the government would no longer provide food, forage or transportation to the company, though supplies continued to be provided to the end of the month in order to allow the railroad to arrange for its own supply. The road would suffer a shortage of rolling stock, shortage of manpower and weather caused problems, but construction was finished and the road was contributing to the support of Richmond and the army, though at a lower level of supply than what was desired by its customers.

The Piedmont Railroad had taken twenty-three months of actual work to build. The job could have been completed much quicker if the Confederate government had impressed labor and iron, but refusing to go that far made the quick completion impossible.