The Construction of the Columbia & Augusta Railroad

The Construction of the Columbia & Augusta Railroad

Long before the war, railroad men had seen the advantages to be had from a single line of connected roads from Richmond to New Orleans/Vicksburg. The common route was to be as straight as possible, while hitting all the main population and railroad centers on the way. The dream route was as follows: Richmond, Danville, Charlotte, Columbia, Augusta, Macon, Montgomery, Jackson and then south to New Orleans or continue west to Vicksburg – and then to Shreveport and on to the Southern Pacific Railroad. Gaps existing in this route when the war began were some of those that received attention for immediate construction – the Piedmont Railroad, the Columbia & Augusta Railroad, the Milledgeville Railroad, the Montgomery & Columbus Railroad and the Selma & Meridian Railroad. The Piedmont Railroad and the Selma & Meridian Railroad were crucial to the support of Richmond and major armies and got first attention. Lack of labor and iron caused the remaining roads to flounder and languish until late in the war, when additional and alternative routes became most important. Labor and iron was still lacking, but interest had picked up.

The Columbia & Augusta Railroad was probably the most important railroad that the Confederacy did not complete. The existing route required a sixty-four mile run south to Branchville, then reverse direction and head seventy-five miles northwest to Augusta. This strange route was the result of the South Carolina Railroad being built to suck inland freight to Charleston, not to connect with neighboring states. The proposed straight line connection would be about seventy miles long, saving seventy miles in freight charges and about eight hours in time. The obvious secondary benefit was the continuation of travel from Augusta to Charlotte if Branchville or Charleston should be lost to the railroad network by Union capture or destruction. This internal line, remote from enemy interference, was the same argument that had been used, successfully and correctly, for the Piedmont Railroad project.

The Columbia & Augusta projected benefitted from three factors: the new road required no significant bridges, the route would mostly be on a ridge top and therefore required less filling and embankments, and the last eleven miles could be run on existing South Carolina Railroad track. Additional, unspoken, benefits of this route would be that slaves that had been sent inland for safety could be used on the work, and the country had not been damaged by enemy raids. The projects drawbacks were the usual – lack of labor and lack of iron.

William Johnston was a highly respected railroad president. He set high standards for his railroads, and achieved them. He was an efficient manager, able to take the debt-saddled Charlotte & South Carolina Railroad and bring it back to full solvency, then built the Atlantic, Tennessee & Ohio Railroad – without state aid or debt. He was the obvious man to extend his two roads south from Columbia to Augusta. Johnston had been involved with this project before the war and in his January 1, 1863 annual report to the Charlotte & South Carolina stockholders he noted their readiness to resume the project whenever the people of Augusta, Columbia and the planters between the two were ready to step up to the task.

It is unfortunate for our story that there were few central government documents generated by the construction project and the state ones were apparently lost with the destruction of Columbia. Regardless, the bare outline of the project can be determined. Newspapers in the area mentioned the need to restart the construction in March and June, 1863. Without any additional documents, it is clear from newspapers that books for subscriptions for stocks opened in various cities and towns in early July; the response was quick and complete. By August 10^th, enough stock had been subscribed to allow the company to organize and call its first meeting. By the 13^th, the meeting had been held and Johnston elected President; James G. Gibbs (or Gibbes) was selected as Chief Engineer.

On October 9^th, Engineer Gibbs advertised for bids for the grading and masonry work on the first twenty miles, starting at Columbia. Bids would close on November 10^th, with the profiles and specifications available in the company office, in Columbia, after October 25. He optimistically noted that the company would probably be able to furnish most of the tools necessary.

December 18^th saw the company call for the rest of the subscription payments, with 35% due January 1, 1864 and the balance, 25% on February 1. It appears that the company had a name change on January 1, from Columbia & Hamburg to Columbia & Augusta Railroad. Hamburg was the first destination of the South Carolina Railroad when it was constructed, but it had not become the center of commerce that Augusta had, so the name change recognized the greater importance of Augusta.

On January 18, 1864, President Johnston wrote Secretary of War Seddon regarding the status of the project and to ask for assistance. He stated that the entire route would be located by the end of the month and offered to contractors. He noted that the confusion regarding the currency was causing the road to delay letting contracts and hoped the government would settle the currency issue. He then asked that Major Melton, Chief of Construction of the State of South Carolina, be allowed to grant exemptions from military duty for up to forty contractors who would obligate themselves to each work not less than twenty slaves on grading the road, getting crossties and constructing bridges. He asked, further, that rations and clothing for the slaves be provided through Government’s agents so that the government and the railroad would not be bidding against each other. If the Secretary would not agree to the Government providing such through its agents, he asked that the company be given transportation priority equal with the government from wherever the railroad had to go to purchase the supplies. The road expected to employ 1,000 to 1,500 hands and would need the supplies for that number. The Company expected to have the road graded and some rail laid by August. However, the Company could not provide the rails and asked the Government to do so.

Colonel Sims, in replying to a request for comment on another matter to the Quartermaster General, stated on April 1, said he could not urge too strongly the need to provide the iron so that this road could be completed. This comment was in the midst of several letters, reports and orders in the Richmond area regarding providing the iron. Unfortunately, none of the documents has survived.

On May 1^st, the President and Directors held a meeting in which they authorized the President to go to Richmond to attempt to speed up the support the road had requested. The Chief Engineer also made an extensive report, which the Columbia South Carolinian published, but it too extensive to quote here. The conclusion was that the route selected was one that rose to the ridge line just west of Columbia and stayed on it almost to Hamburg. The route was selected to reduce the grade the locomotives would have to climb and to reduce the number of bridges required. The route would be a good one for taping future business after the war. Most of the road would be about 500 feet above the level where it starts in Columbia. Only thirteen miles of heavy grading was identified. He estimated 1.1 million cubic yards of excavation and 1.6 million cubic yards of embankment, 2,000 feet of bridging, 8,000 yards of masonry and 200,000 cross ties.

Engineer Gibbes projected eight months for a force of 1,000 hands for the grading, with an additional 100 hands on the bridging and a final 100 getting out the superstructure (mostly the cross ties). Wooden piers would be used to speed the construction of the Congree River bridge of such a type that would allow permanent masonry construction later without interrupting traffic.

During the week after the meeting, advertisements are found for hands and supplies in several newspapers. The numbers are not large and indicate that each contractor was advertising for the hands he needed for his own contract. Then came the big call, with a July 16^th ad for 1,000 hands, to start work promptly. Tools would be furnished by the Company and the contractors would be detailed by the Secretary of War and all their supplies would be exempt from impressment.

Providing engineering supervision may have been a problem. Prior to starting the work, Johnston had requested a particular Captain from the Engineer Department, but he was refused. In mid-May, the principal assistant engineer to Engineer Gibbes was appointed an Engineer Bureau Captain and ordered to report to General Lee in Virginia.

The Editor of the Augusta Constitutionalist noted on September 29^th that he had met with Johnston and learned that 400 hands were at work on the two ends of the new road and the planters in the center section were completing the central portion. He reported again on December 24^th that the road had 560 hand employed, with the whole line under contract and twenty-five miles graded. More hands were wanted immediately. The Editor then dove into the question of sourcing the iron rails. In his opinion (sharpened, not doubt by Sherman’s army), the Charleston & Savannah Railroad and much of the Central (of Georgia) Railroad should be taken up immediately to supply the company. He had been assured that the road could be completed by March 1^st if the South Carolina Legislature provided the necessary assistance and if they did not, the Georgia Legislature should provide it. In a separate article, he pressed the completion of the Milledgeville Railroad, another segment of that great railroad from Richmond to the West.

On October 8, 1864, General Order #77 was issued in Richmond. It revoked all details that had been granted under authority of the War Department to men ages 18 to 45 and all such detailed men were required to assemble at the camps of instruction for service in the armies. This cost the project many of its contractors and many of their slaves.

On December 27^th, Johnston wrote Secretary Seddon that by October he had about 600 hands, with the required contractors. But despite the General Order, he had still managed to have 400 hands at work. Then the military authorities at Augusta took 300 of them to fortify the city. He was still adding hands and had between 500 and 600 hands at work. The great difficulty was in getting the contractors, eight or nine of whom he had managed to get detailed again, and a few older men. If the War Department would detail or exempt sixty contractors, he thought he could get 1,500 to 2,000 slaves on the work and could have both ends of the road ready for rails by April and the rest of the road could take iron as soon as it could be had. The road would be seventy-nine miles long, but ten miles of South Carolina Railroad track would be used near Augusta, leaving sixty-nine miles of iron needed from the Government. He proposed taking the iron of the Charleston & Savannah Railroad or a portion of the South Carolina Railroad south of Branchville or, if necessary, the entire seventy-five miles of the Spartanburg & Union Railroad.

Engineer Bureau Chief Gilmer endorsed the letter of January 2, 1865 that the exposure of the South Carolina Railroad south of Branchville made it essential that the road should be pushed and the sixty men details and transportation assistance for materials should be provided. The South Carolina Legislature passed a resolution asking the Secretary of War to make construction of the road a priority.

Then the record goes silent. Sherman headed north from Savannah in early January and took Columbia on February 16^th. It seems likely that, as long as the hands could be fed, the work continued. But laying iron waited until a year after the war ended. The road accepted traffic in 1867.