The Construction of the Blue Mountain Railroad

The Construction of the Blue Mountain Railroad

The Alabama & Tennessee River Railroad Company had almost completed their road from Selma to Gadsden, both in Alabama, when the war began. Cars were running to Blue Mountain Station, 25 miles north of Talladega by the spring of 1862 and grading was well underway for the 27-mile long Gadsden leg. But a road from Gadsden to Nashville, the original plan, no longer met the needs of the new nation. War needs were pushing the road toward Chattanooga, by way of Rome, Georgia. Such a road had already been laid out and the charters passed by both State governments.

The new road is known to history as the Blue Mountain Railroad, though it never carried that name. The official names were: Alabama & Georgia Railroad and Georgia & Alabama Railroad, with the divide being at the state line. Such an arrangement already existed on the Alabama & Florida Railroads (of Alabama and Florida), separate railroad companies, but roads that needed each other to be viable. Newspapers and others sometimes used the Jacksonville to Dalton name, taking hold of the two farthest apart significant towns, but this version of the road required ninety-five miles of impossible to procure iron rails. The route from Blue Mountain to Rome would require only sixty-one miles of rail.

The requirements that called for the new direction of travel were two – the need to provide provisions and men more quickly to the Army of Tennessee, north of Chattanooga, from the heart of Alabama and the need to ship coal and iron from the just opening mineral fields in northern Alabama to the war machines in Virginia. Both routes would save much time and cost by taking the short route and skipping the Atlanta and Western & Atlantic Railroad bottlenecks.

On August 14, 1862, General Bragg boasted to General Cooper, in Richmond, that the Selma & Meridian project was well under way, without creating any disturbances among the population or railroads, and he now required the same effort be made to create the Jacksonville to Rome line to support his army so that the lost territory in Tennessee (Nashville and the meat-producing central part of the state) could be recovered. The normal War Department speed got a report on the proposed project from the Engineer Bureau to the Secretary of War by September 16^th.

Acting Engineer Bureau Chief Major A. L. Rives pointed out that the existing route, from Selma to Kingston, by way of Montgomery, was 121 miles longer than the proposed route from Selma to Rome. The existing route also required using steamboats for 100 miles and having the gauge change caused by the Montgomery & West Point Railroad, meaning a total of four loads/unloads not required by the proposed route. He then gave a reasonably detailed estimate of the likely cost of the new route -- $1,122,480.92. He noted that the bridges of Etowah River and Cedar Creek, the only two important streams and both in Georgia, had already been constructed.

On October 2^nd, Congress authorized a loan of the exact, to the penny, amount that Engineer Rives had estimated. The estimate and the act both had two, fatal, flaws. First, the price had been estimated in September, 1862, with no provision for the ever climbing cost of goods and a likely completion date of spring in the following year. Second, the source of the iron was certainly going to be other railroads, with their self-important owners, and a government that was loath to force the “contributions” of the iron, at any price.

Since the Georgia & Alabama Railroad Company had already organized, subscribed stock, received money and completed much grading and bridge construction, the question regarding the government loan was who would receive it on the Alabama side. Alabama & Tennessee River Railroad President Thomas A. Walker had gone to Richmond to push the project and had worked with the Engineer Bureau and the Congress to get the act passed. He arrived back in Alabama in mid-October, to the thanks of all for pushing and completing the steps necessary to get the approval and the loan. News reports said that the road would be completed ninety days after work began.

The first construction step in Alabama was for the Alabama & Tennessee River road to complete the nine and a half miles of their road from Blue Mountain to Jacksonville. On October 22^nd, advertisements appeared calling for contractors to submit bids for this work, including the track laying, by November 5^th at the company offices in Selma. Bids were also called for on the same date, for the twenty-seven miles from Jacksonville to the Georgia state line, as soon as notice was given that the surveys of that leg had been completed. William Rothrock, Chief Engineer and General Superintendent of the Alabama & Tennessee River Railroad placed the ads and was in charge of the Alabama side of the project.

An exchange of letters from President Walker and Chief of the Engineer Bureau Colonel J. F. Gilmer showed how slowly papers moved. Walker wrote on October 20^th, asking what the terms of the contract they had agreed to were; Gilmer answered by letter on November 11^th and forwarded the problem to Engineer Captain L. P. Grant, for him to work out the details with Walker’s representatives. Captain Grant was already on the line of the road and could be reached at Rome or Jacksonville. A letter from Mr. Duff Green, Chairman of the committee of the Jacksonville & Dalton Railroad, to President Davis, stating that the committee was ready to make the contract and wanted to be heard before any contract was signed, received the same answer Walker had received.

Colonel Gilmer’s instructions to Captain Grant, also dated the 22^nd, contained instructions about the required completion date (six to ten months from the date of the contract), the form of bonds and mortgage involved and the repayment schedule ($50,000 to 100,000 per year, beginning at the end of twelve months after the day named in the contract for the completion of the road). The instructions had the approval of Secretary of War Randolph.

As with the Selma & Meridian Railroad project, the Government failed to take into account the fact that two different companies were involved and the division of the bonds from the act was not discussed. Now, the Georgia project’s president insisted that there was no reason for his railroad to accept the Government’s bonds if the Government was not going to provide the iron, since money spent without the iron (which the railroads could not buy at any price) would be money wasted. Shorter’s letter to Davis of October 25 received Secretary of War Randolph’s promise that the Government would exert its utmost powers in procuring the iron.

However, within just a few day, Secretary Randolph resigned his position and movement on the government side stopped to await a new Secretary of War and then to get to his calendar for his decision on providing the iron. While waiting for the new Secretary, James A. Seddon, Captain Grant was requested to identify the specific railroads that could be taken up to provide the needed iron.

On December 9^th, Colonel Gilmer directed Captain Grant to make the contracts for the roads, but the agreements were not to be binding on the Government until approved by the Secretary of War. The list of proposed railroads for their iron removal had been received and was under consideration. President Walker signed the contract for the Alabama side of the project on January 1, 1863, with the agreement that $220,000 of the total loan would be paid to his road to get the grading, cross ties and tracklaying accomplished. The government agreed to a ten month construction period, with extensions, day for day, if the work was delayed waiting on delivery of the rails, chairs and spikes from the government.

Advertisements appeared in newspapers on January 8^th, inviting bids for bridging, grading and superstructure for the twenty-two miles from Rome to the Alabama line. Bids for cross ties were also called for at the same time. The bids were requested immediately and must state how quickly the contractors can complete the work that they bid for.

A letter dated January 30, 1863 and addressed to “The commission to examine and advise on what Rail Roads in the C. S. the iron on their tracks can be best dispensed with” directed the commissioners to report on the possibility of procuring the iron from the railroads on Captain Grant’s list, for use on the Blue Mountain road. The author has no information on who comprised such a commission at this time; a formal Commission was instituted in June, 1863, but this one, and its members, is unknown.

On January 29^th, the Rome Southerner newspaper announced that 100 or more hands were hard at work on the Alabama side of the road and asked why the Georgia side was not likewise under construction. The Jacksonville, Al. Republican noted on February 5^th that work was about to commence in earnest. Listed in the same issue were several advertisements. One was for bids on 90,000 cross ties, to be delivered along the thirty-seven miles of the Alabama line of the road at the rate of 2,400 per mile. They were to be eight and a half feet long, seven inches thick with a face of at least eight inches, sawed or cut square on the ends, well hewed on two sides, barked, and piled convenient to the road bed, forty-five ties per 100 feet. Post and white oak was preferred, but other varieties of oak and pine would be accepted in they were chiefly heart. Ties would be bought in large or small lots, with payment made on certificate of delivery. Bids were required within twenty days. George Wadsworth signed as Chief Engineer.

A second ad called for 500 laborers, to be used on a Government appropriation for the Blue Mountain & Rome Railroad construction. The work was the most interior of any work in the country and would be done in a healthy location. Six to twelve months of profitable work would be available. The third ad called for fifty carpenters, or men who could handle an axe well, to work on bridges, trestles, cross ties, depot buildings, etc. Good wages would be paid and those having good axes should bring them along. Men were to report to Blue Mountain or Jacksonville. The last ad sought contractors for thirty miles of graduation, masonry and bridging. The work was mostly light embankments, which would be chiefly cast up from the sides. Bids for any part of the work would be received until the 25^th of the month.

The day after the ads appeared, Chief Engineer Wadsworth wrote General Bragg that, knowing Bragg’s interest in the project, he wanted to provide the General a map of the future road and ask his assistance in getting it completed. Wadsworth noted that there was less than 250,000 cubic yards of light embankment work scattered over the entire 60 miles of the road and no heavy work to be done. He was planning on having 500 hands on the work by February 22 and intended to give him a through trip by June 22. He asked for help with the cost of provisions – they were available on the line of the road, but at “blockade prices.” He asked for shovels, picks and wheelbarrows from the army, since the army had abandoned the breastworks system of fighting and the tools lay idle. He asked for one man per mile of road (“hardly a corporal’s guard”) to be detailed to cut timber on the route, overlooking the road in most places. Finally, he asked for the men who owned saw mills on the line of the road to be detailed to run their mills.

In mid-February, Captain Grant reported that the engineering work was progressing rapidly and would be finished before the hands could be on site. He asked the Engineer Bureau if a contract would be made with the Georgia & Alabama Railroad for the Georgia side of the project. The reply was that the contract would be delayed a short time until more positive information could be obtained regarding obtaining the iron from other roads. On March 7^th advertisements were placed for contractors, 100 hands, 10,000 pounds bacon and 6,000 bushels corn for use on the Georgia portion of the road.

Three days later, on March 10^th, Engineer Gilmer telegraphed President Walker that the Secretary of War Seddon had decided that the Government was unable to furnish the required iron for the project. There was no progress until April 11^th, when Gilmer again telegraphed Walker that the Secretary of War would loan the $220,000 for preparation of the roadbed and crossties, but the company would have to provide its own iron.

By April 16, the Alabama Congressional delegation had tried to influence the Engineer Bureau on the iron matter, with no success. But the refusal to provide the iron must have been closely held in Alabama, since work was continuing and the Georgia & Alabama Railroad was asking if they could get a loan to finish the roadbed, like the Alabama & Tennessee River was to receive, but without any mention of the iron issue. The Engineer Bureau then ordered Grant to go to Alabama to recommend suspending work on the Blue Mountain road. At the same time, Gilmer wrote the Secretary and recommended providing the loan to the Georgia road so that if the road were needed, the track could be quickly laid down. Perhaps Gilmer sensed that Seddon would change his mind on the iron and wanted the project to stay on track. Seddon, with President Davis’ approval, did approve giving the loan to the Georgia & Alabama Railroad.

Captain Grant paid $60,000 to the Alabama & Tennessee River Railroad on June 2 for grading, masonry, bridging, crossties, tools and teams under the January 1, 1863 contract.

By September 4^th, Gilmer was desperate to get the Secretary to allow the iron removal and forwarded a letter from Walker, endorsed by General Johnston and others urging the extreme military importance of the connection. It was universally agreed that, after the Piedmont Railroad, no other railroad project was as important to the Confederacy and this one. He pointed out that the War Department had steadfastly refused to bind itself to provide the iron and that the removal of iron from the Cahaba, Marion & Greensboro, the Mississippi, Gainesville & Tuscaloosa and the North Western Railroad of Alabama Railroads had all been stopped for special reasons by the War Department. It takes little insight to see that the refusal to remove those roads was caused by President Davis not wanting to go against the money interests of Alabama; questions at this level were not decided by the Secretary of War, except in consultation with Davis.

On October 10^th, Gilmer wrote Seddon that with the loss of Chattanooga, the Tennessee and northern Georgia coal and iron were no longer available to the Confederacy. It was critical that the Blue Mountain connection be made to speed the flow of coal and iron to the rest of the nation. Rives was being directed to work with Colonel St. John, of the Nitre and Mining Bureau to take such steps as they could devise. Rives learned from Grant that four months of the full work force would be required to finish the road.

By December 5^th, Rives wrote to another senior Engineer officer that with the present situation around Chattanooga, he did not feel it right to push resuming the Blue Mountain project.

March 7^th, 1864 saw Richmond receive another letter from Walker, with endorsements by General Forney and General Polk, regarding completing the road. On the 17^th, Sam Tate wrote the President to urge the road be finished. By the 14^th, Rives asked Colonel C. F. M. Garnett, head of the Iron Commission, to state freely whether the iron could be found for the Blue Mountain without compromising the supply of iron for maintaining the main lines.

Richmond came to life on April 28^th, with Rives ordering Lieutenant Colonel Minor Meriwether, of the Iron Commission, to take active and earnest measures to press forward the grading of the Blue Mountain road, securing ties and iron as promptly as practicable so that the track could be laid down with all possible dispatch. On May 19^th, Meriwether wrote General Polk that there were fifteen miles on the Blue Mountain end and sixteen miles on the Rome end ready for the track and thirty miles remaining to grade, but requiring only 100,000 cubic yards of light work. He intended to take the Mississippi, Gainesville & Tuscaloosa Railroad and lay it on the Blue Mountain end and, when the battle at Resaca was decided in the Confederacy’s favor, he would take part of the South Western Railroad in Georgia and lay it on the Rome end. The remaining thirty miles could be prepared quickly, if sufficient hands were impressed and not stopped by injunctions from taking the iron from the two roads mentioned. He wrote that it would probably be necessary to use military force to impress the iron and he wanted Polk’s backing to do such. Because of Polk’s death, the letter was never sent, but it has survived and shows the plans and the desperation felt regarding completing the road.

Major Thomas Peters, Quartermaster, was assigned to the project in late July, but by then the war had rendered the connection meaningless and it faded away after a Congressional investigation.

Had the road been constructed when desired, it might have made the life of the Amy of Tennessee easier, but it would have been very short of rolling stock and could not have had a major impact. The wasting of a year in deciding to allow the removal of certain iron (which would have been fought in the courts) is indicative of the stress of trying to decide where to assign the limited and shrinking stock of rails in the Confederacy.