Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac
| Railroad Co., President's Office |
| Richmond, July 30, 1863 |
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| Hon. James A. Seddon |
| Secretary of War |
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| Sir, |
| The return of General Lee's army to
Virginia, and the necessity of shortly supplying it from Richmond,
make the destruction of the four railroad bridges and other
structures at and near Hanover Junction an object of primary
importance to the enemy and of solicitude to the Confederacy,
involving, by the impossibility of restoring those structures in
less than two or three mouths, the necessity of a hurried and
disastrous retreat by General Lee to the vicinity of this city, if
not farther. I observe in the newspapers a statement that a large
cavalry force is being congregated at Williamsburg for another
expedition, most probably to this very point, and to be supported by
a column of infantry and artillery. Permit me again to invite your
attention to the expediency of protecting not merely these bridges
and buildings at and near Hanover Junction, but other parts of these
roads and the country on both sides of the Pamunkey, through which
these devastating raids are made, by stationing an active
expeditionary force of light artillery, cavalry, and infantry
(mounted if practicable), not pent up as at present in the forks of
the Pamunkey, formed by the North and South Anna Rivers, at Hanover
Junction. A comparatively small force would man the works there and
hold that point if protected from an attack in their rear, but
beyond the North Anna, near Chesterfield Station, thirty miles from
Richmond, from which point they could fully protect the rear of the
works and position at the bridges near the Junction, otherwise
untenable if attacked in their rear, and at the same time be ever
ready to meet and by rapid marches, especially at night, to attack
in flank and cut off or at least drive back any expedition moving
toward these bridges from Williamsburg or the White House. At the
same time this force would in this way be a protection to the people
and crops of the counties of Hanover, Louisa, Caroline, King
William, and even of King and Queen and Essex, and would be always
in supporting distance not only of the forces near these bridges and
of another less and advance force (which should be stationed between
Hanover Court House and Old Church to protect the Central road south
of the South Anna, and especially the trestle-work near Hanover
Court-House and the Chickahominy), but of both Richmond and
Fredericksburg, to either of which points from Chesterfield Station
a whole army division of 8,000 or 10,000 men could by the united
machinery of the two railroads be easily transported in twenty-four
hours or less at the rate of 3,000 men every four hours. Thus if a
whole division were detailed for this purpose, from the defense of
Richmond or Fredericksburg, they could be easily returned to either
point where they were needed before the enemy could reach it, while
they would be quartered in a healthy country abounding in good water
and pasturage, upon the line of two railroads available for
transporting them and their supplies. Several objections I know have
been made to this plan. First, that it would not do to withdraw
troops from the defense of Richmond against attacks from other
quarters, and second, that the roads and bridges along the south
side of the Mattapony might not admit of the rapid marches and flank
attack proposed by this plan. The first objection I have already
answered in stating the facility and rapidity with which these
troops may be returned to Richmond, and may add that they would be a
protection against any raid approaching the city from the west
between the North Anna and James Rivers. As to the second objection,
I have some personal knowledge of the country, having practiced law
in those counties for several years, and my own belief of the
practicability of the routes for such flanking movements on the
enemy as I have suggested is confirmed by recent conversations with
several intelligent and well-informed residents of those counties,
who assure me that the roads and bridges (over small streams) on
those routes along the southern side of the Mattapony are entirely
practicable and favorable for such movements of artillery, as well
as of cavalry and infantry. I may add that no force pent up in the
Ark of the Pamunkey at Hanover Junction can prevent an attack in
their rear by an enemy coming from the direction of either the White
House and crossing the railroad about Chesterfield, as the last
expedition proposed to do, or from Fredericksburg or down the
Central Railroad from Louisa or Goochland; and the engineer officer
who constructed the works recently erected to protect the bridges
near Hanover Junction told me that they did not and could not
protect these positions against an attack from the west or rear,
which could be protected only, and that imperfectly, by a line of
works extending some five miles between the North and South Anna
Rivers. A reference to these views by yourself, the President, or
General Lee to the large map of the State cannot, I think, fail to
satisfy each of you of their correctness, as they have several
prominent military men to whom they have been presented. A dangerous
error exists as to the time needed to restore these bridges, etc.,
if destroyed. I assure you it would be impossible to do so in less
than from sixty to ninety days.
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| With high respect, your obedient servant |
| P. V. Daniel, Jr. |
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