OR, Series 1, Vol. 47, Part 2, Page 1395

Headquarters, Petersburg, March 15, 1865
 
General J. E. Johnston
Comdg. Dept. North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida
 
General,
   I received today by Major Saunders your letter of the 11th instant. You will probably have received by this time my communication of the same date, in which I endeavored to describe to you my condition. You are right in supposing that the course you may be able to pursue will materially affect mine. If you are forced back from Raleigh, and we be deprived of the supplies from East North Carolina, I do not know how this army can be supported. Yet a disaster to your army will not improve my condition, and while I would urge upon you to neglect no opportunity of delivering the enemy a successful blow, I would not recommend you to engage in a general battle without a reasonable prospect of success. I think it more probable that Sherman will unite Schofield with him at Raleigh than that he will unite with Schofield near Kinston; but in either event an opportunity may occur for you and Bragg to unite upon one of their columns and crush it. I do not think I could maintain my position were I further to reduce my force. That you may understand my situation I will state that the supplies in Virginia are exhausted. The enemy has succeeded in cutting off the Weldon {Petersburg RR} railroad, and my only reliance is the communication by Danville {Piedmont RR and Richmond & Danville RR}. General Grant has intrenched himself on both sides of James River, stretching toward the swamps of the Chickahominy on the north bank, and Hatcher's Run on the south. On this long line, with far inferior numbers, I confront him. His numerical superiority has been increased since detaching Hoke, Conner, and Hampton. His present preponderance in cavalry, and his ability unperceived to mass his troops while holding his intrenchments on either side of the river, enables him constantly to threaten our flanks and causes legitimate apprehension for the safety of the Danville road. You will therefore perceive that if I contract my lines as you propose, with the view of holding Richmond, our only resource for obtaining subsistence will be cut off, and the city must be abandoned; whereas, if I take a position to maintain the road, Richmond will be lost. I think you can now understand the condition of affairs and correctly estimate the importance of resisting the farther advance of Sherman. But should that not be possible, you will also see that I cannot remain here, but must start out and seek a favorable opportunity for battle. I shall maintain my position as long as it appears advisable, both from the moral and material advantages of holding Richmond and Virginia. If obliged to abandon it, so far as I can now see I shall be compelled to fall back to the Danville road for subsistence, and unless that subsistence can be supplied from the State of North Carolina, I do not know whence it can be obtained. If Richmond is given up the sooner we can strike one of the columns of the enemy the better, but on which side of the Roanoke must depend on circumstances. Should Gaston be your best point to reach the Roanoke, as stated by Generals Holmes and Gatlin, you would have the advantage of the bridge at that place on which to cross the river; but unless you could bring supplies with you I think your army would suffer. I have sent an engineer officer to examine the crossings, roads, &c., from Danville to Field's Ferry, below Clarksville. I recommend you do the same. Information as to what provisions and forage can be relied on I think also desirable. In my opinion the farther east we confine Sherman the better, and the more room it will allow for maneuvering the armies. I have endeavored to give you all information necessary for determining your operations. If there is any point on which you wish further, please advise me. I have not pretended to lay down fixed rules which at this distance and at this time cannot safely be done, but rely upon your good judgment and skill to accomplish everything that is possible to attain our common end--the greatest success. Unity of purpose and harmony of action between the two armies, with the blessing of God, I trust will relieve us from the difficulties that now beset us.
Most truly and respectfully, yours,
R. E. Lee
General

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