Subsistence Department, C. S. A. |
Richmond,
February 9, 1865 |
|
Hon. John C. Breckinridge |
Secretary of War |
|
Sir, |
In response to your circular of 7th instant,
received yesterday, I have the honor to submit for your
consideration the papers herewith inclosed, with the following
remarks: |
During the past fifteen
months it has been my duty to make many and most urgent
representations to the War Department of the danger of want
impending over the troops of the Army of Northern Virginia, and also
of the stringent necessity (for the safety of Richmond, of the State
of Virginia, and probably of the Confederacy) that accumulations of
supplies should be made in this city. The obstacles in the way of
this and the plans to surmount those obstacles have been pressed
repeatedly and the needed requirements urged. In my communications
and indorsements to the Secretaries of War and the Treasury, and to
others, I have fully set forth these difficulties as indicated by
circumstances and urged with pertinacity the adoption of measures to
overcome them. The arguments used by me have been, in my judgment,
incontrovertible, but have had but little effect, and the Army of
Virginia has for several months suffered the consequence of their
non-adoption, during which period it has been living literally
"from hand to mouth." The other armies of the Confederacy
have been differently circumstanced, and do not, for the present, so
much suffer from local deficiency or insufficient means of
transportation. During the whole of the year 1864 consumption has
been much more rapid than collection, and accumulations already
made, instead of being increased, were consumed. During the first
three months of that year a larger amount of money (in old issue)
was turned into the Treasury by the officers of the commissariat
than was issued by it to them in the new, and since that time only a
part of what was due has been paid. As a consequence, their
indebtedness has become overwhelming, until everywhere credit was
lost, and supplies which might have been obtained for the
subsistence of the army passed into other hands. |
The same state of affairs,
to even a greater extent, exists now in the period of collection,
and, as a consequence of the lack of money and credit, not one-fifth
of the hogs which could have been secured have been or will be
obtained for the army. Supplies which had been purchased at the
islands to bridge over to the incoming crop of meat have not been
brought in and are now not available. Repeated orders for their
shipment were without effect, and plans proposed by this bureau to
secure that object have not been permitted or have been frustrated
by circumstances beyond the control of the bureau. |
The retention of many
thousand of prisoners of war in this city caused the consumption of
our reserve of flour, deficient transportation preventing their
entire subsistence on corn from the south, as had been intended. The
supply of the Army of Northern Virginia requires special
consideration, for the ravages of the enemy in the country in which
it operates have left not a full supply even for the non-combatants;
hence its basis of supply are very remote, and that supply must be
con-tin gent on the means of collecting in those remote localities
an excess over the wants of the troops there operating. This army is
also sustained by various contrivances to draw supplies from beyond
our lines by barter and by secret arrangements with the enemy,
turning on their anxiety to get cotton. For both these purposes
funds and credit are both necessary; hence it is obvious that the
subsistence of the army rests on a most precarious foundation. The
instant passage of the amendment to the Tithe bill, and its active
execution; the exercise of authority to impress teams along the line
of roads to bring supplies forward; the furnishing of some coin and
of sufficient funds to purchase articles of barter and to pay for
4,000 bales of cotton immediately, and to purchase supplies
throughout the land, are all indispensable at this juncture. |
It is also necessary that the management of the Danville and
Piedmont Railroad shall be rendered efficient, and that we shall
hold the southwestern counties of Virginia and those in North
Carolina lying adjacent. In that section of country arrangements
have been instituted by Major Shelby to send forward supplies to
this army. This is especially important since the loss of East
Tennessee, where operations had been set on foot of a most promising
character. |
***** |
The ravages of the enemy
destroying the fruits of the earth, the appliances for production,
and stock animals persisted in by them, in order to starve us and to
exclude us from all territory entered by them, is an impediment to
subsistence which I have (from their first experiment to test our
endurance on this point) represented to be fatal if permitted, but
which can always be stopped by that side when the necessity to check
it becomes stronger than the stimulus to the atrocity. The worst
feature of the condition here is the deficiency of breadstuffs,
which is due to the failure of the War Department to enforce firmly
a suggestion often made by me for two years past to stop all travel
and private freight and continue that expedient until our supplies
were forwarded. This was promised by the Secretary in January, 1864,
but not tried until March, when it was eminently successful. Had
this been fully carried out, an accumulation of corn in Georgia
ready for shipment could have been stored here. Repeatedly has this
been urged in vain, until now the connection being broken by Sherman
places that supply beyond our reach. From the beginning of the war
this bureau has had policy in reference to the main principles
necessary to effect the objects for which it was created: |
***** |
Second. As this war would be
necessarily conducted on and along railroad lines, these should be
harmonized and kept up to their highest point of efficiency and
capacity of repairs in road-bed and rolling-stock. I therefore
proposed a plan and expedients for obtaining this end. This subject
requires instant attention. |
***** |
Time and repeated
Congressional investigations (on several subjects) have in every
case vindicated the policy of this bureau. I therefore claim to be
competent to speak with information well based, and to affirm that,
unless suitable men, unembarrassed by fears of removal (except for
inefficiency), ample funds, and (for the present) coin in sufficient
quantity to keep the Army of Virginia in beeves (which, being at
present driven from beyond our lines, can be obtained by coin
alone), are furnished, and the means of transportation from the
south increased, this bureau cannot perform its functions. And this
brings me finally to the inquiry you make--as to the ability of a
chief of this bureau to effect the purposes for which it was
created. I observe, then, that, in my judgment, it cannot be done,
except under an administration of the other branches of service
(whose operations underlie those of this bureau) different from the
past. The Treasury must supply funds as needed; transportation must
be found, both wagon and rail. Over neither of these subjects can
this bureau exercise any control, except by application to the
Treasury for the one and to the Quartermaster's Department for the
other. This latter has its own supplies of forage to gather, and, as
controlling transportation, its officers naturally serve that
department first, especially in wagon transportation for hauling in
from the country. The Secretary of War must be a center of unity to
all the subordinate branches of his department. Had this been
effectually acted on, it is probable that the supplies of this
bureau, now at the islands, would have been brought in. Without the
appliances to buy, fabricate, and transport, necessary results
cannot be achieved; and where these appliances are not furnished in
a measure commensurate with requirements, the essentials of food
must be first sought, and when the means to procure even these are
not adequately supplied, then the distribution of that which is
procurable must be proportionately restricted. |
I illustrate by stating that
the adherence of this bureau (under the embarrassments referred to)
to the reduction of the meat ration, notwithstanding the urgent
applications of General Lee, has alone enabled it to furnish meat
thus far; and foreseeing the inevitable deficiency ahead, I asked
the Secretary eight months ago to put the bread rations at one
pound. He refused, and I did it on my own responsibility. This
continued for some months, and General Lee at length urgently
applied for increase; the Secretary of War also pressed it. I
refused, unless positively ordered, in the face of my declaration
that it was absolutely necessary to keep it at that point without
due funds and improved transportation from the south. On 14th of
December I recommended the reduction by general order, and he then
reluctantly assented. Without this proceeding on my part this army
would absolutely have been destitute. I mention this fact to exhibit
the straits to which this bureau was driven under the embarrassment
referred to above. |
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, |
L. B. Northrop |
Commissary-General of Subsistence |
|