| Richmond,
December 2, 1864 |
| |
| [General Braxton Bragg] |
| |
| General, |
| I trust you will pardon my presumption
in writing you on military subjects, but my knowledge of the country
and the railway lines in Georgia and South Carolina emboldens me to
offer a suggestion, which I am certain you will receive in the
spirit in which it is offered. Of course it will occur to you that
the moment the enemy reaches Millen, in Georgia, and any point on the
Charleston
& Savannah Railroad in South Carolina, Savannah
becomes hopelessly isolated, and can neither raise re-enforcements
from Augusta
or Charleston, nor send any to either of those places. Some place must be given
up, however, and it were better Savannah
than Charleston. But there is a large amount of most valuable rolling-stock at
Savannah, and many locomotives, tools, machine shops, cotton and tobacco.
The cotton and tobacco should be destroyed, if necessary, and the
rolling-stock, &c., run out before the Charleston
& Savannah
road is cut. Should Sherman reach any point on that road, or a
column come out from Beaufort and occupy it, everything of value in
Savannah must be lost; for if well out on the {Savannah,
Albany &} Gulf road to Thomasville, a raiding party of
1,000 men would find no difficulty in destroying it. It is
impossible for us here to say where Sherman
is going. Your last telegram left him at No. 9, ten miles above
Millen. Supposing the rear column may reach Grahamville, he may move
down the Central {(of Georgia)} road to
Savannah, in which case no concentration can be made against him, as he
would tear up the road as he advanced, whilst both flanks would be
protected, the one by the
Savannah
and the other by the Ogeechee
River. Such forces as might be at Savannah, unable to escape to
Charleston
and beyond the reach of re-enforcements, would have to retire toward
Thomasville. Indeed, if the enemy should establish himself on the
Charleston
& Savannah
road -- either by moving up from the sea and down from Georgia
-- Savannah, Southern Georgia, and all Florida
would pass into his hands. This will be evident upon an inspection
of the map. It would seem to be of the first importance, therefore,
to save the movable railway property at Savannah, of which there is
a large amount, and to do this it must be removed before the
Charleston & Savannah road is cut, unless Sherman cross the
river opposite Millen: in which case it might be moved up the
Central road to that point. |
| Of
Sherman
's ultimate object there can be but little doubt, viz, the reduction
of Savannah
or Charleston. If the former, then he will establish a water base there and throw
forward his advance to Millen, and thus cut our communications. If Charleston
be his object, as it probably is, then his establishment at that
place would leave him only sixty miles to march to reach
Branchville, where he would place himself astride the only line by
which we can communicate with the South. In this event his base
would be unassailable and his flanks, admirably protected by a river
and swamp on either hand, would be free from attack. For four years
the enemy has tried to penetrate the Confederacy from the north and
east by land. He reached
Atlanta
it is true, but found it impossible to keep open his communications,
since the further he advanced the longer and more difficult of
defense became his base and line of communication. This policy, it
now appears, has been changed. Hereafter he will operate from the
sea or some of its tributaries. This makes his lease safe, and
renders it easy to protect his short communications. This policy
reduces the length of his communications to sixty miles from Charleston
to Branchville, whereas before it was near 500 miles from Louisville
to Atlanta. After Charleston, Wilmington
will probably be the next point of attack, and then Richmond. These ideas have been floating through my mind. There may be
nothing in them. If so, you will be sure to find it out and no harm
will come of them. All I can hope is that you will excuse me for
presuming to send them to you. It strikes me that your suggestion of
concentration is the only alternative left us, and should be
adopted. We must make up our minds to abandon some place and
concentrate for a stubborn resistance. There is nothing new here. I
do not think Grant has the least idea of attacking Lee. He is only maneuvering
to prevent his sending re-enforcements to Georgia. *** |
| Very truly, yours, |
| P. W. Alexander |
|