| Headquarters Third Military District |
| Pocotaligo, November 19, 1863 |
| |
| Brig. Gen. Thomas Jordan |
| Chief of Staff and Assistant
Adjutant-General |
| |
| General, |
| I judge that the Abolition
forces will soon despair of taking Charleston
in front. If they do attempt it, it will probably be with their
iron-clads running into Charleston
Harbor, in which event there will only be an artillery fight. Their
present force is totally inadequate for a land attack. |
| Failing at Charleston, it is a probable supposition that they will attempt to do
something, and the most available point to retrieve themselves by a
cheap success is presented in my district. You are aware that there
is only a portion of one company (Captain [John H.] Mickler's)
acting as infantry in my command, stationed at Bluffton, and 390 old
men and boys in the regiment South Carolina
State
troops. This body of militia cannot be depended on against
disciplined troops, though it might do well at certain points as an
auxiliary. There is also a small company acting as guard of Savannah River
Bridge. From your acquaintance with this country and the character and
number of my troops, I know you do not consider it practicable for
me to concentrate sufficient force in my command to resist the
advance of a column of 4,000 of the enemy, without re-enforcements.
If the plans of the enemy are well matured and vigorously carried
out, I should be forced to retire from the works commanding the
railroad {the Charleston & Savannah RR} before
the re-enforcements arrive. The success of Pocotaligo in October,
1862, was largely owing to the natural strength of the position.
Such success could not probably be expected should the enemy advance
from Field's Point or toward Grahamville or Coosawhatchie. The
present line below the railroad is a strong one if there are troops
to man it. If driven from the railroad, there is no line we could
expect to hold short of the Edisto
River. Should the enemy occupy the railroad, we would not only lose the
short line of communication between Charleston
and Savannah, but we would lose a strong line of defense, and open an immense
outlet to the negro population of the State. I think, therefore,
that it is worth a determined and anxious effort to hold the line.
For this purpose, I should have at Pocotaligo not less than 1,000
infantry and a battery of artillery, seasoned fighting troops, with
transportation ready at Pocotaligo; this to constitute a movable
column, to be thrown on any point that may be assailed. At Charleston
there should be 2,000 or 3,000 infantry, with two batteries of
artillery near the line of the Charleston
& Savannah Railroad, with transportation ready, to serve as a
reserve. With the first named and my cavalry force, I could hope to
hold in check 4,000 men; with the addition of the re-enforcements
named, 10,000. Should the enemy, however, be so unwise as to make a
land attack on Charleston, the force here could serve as a reserve, and be moved to your
assistance. It might be of the last importance in moving rapidly to
the defense of Savannah, now weakened. If re-enforcements are to be sent, and the
Charleston
& Savannah
road can only furnish a locomotive without cars, I may be able to
get the latter from R. R. Cuyler, president Georgia
road, as I did last year. Even, however, in the absence of this
special train, I might use the sand train of Mr. Buckhalter, as was
done so successfully in October, 1862. With the re-enforcements
mentioned above, should the attack be made by a column of 15,000
men, I judge I would have to retire after fully feeling their force.
There would not be sufficient transportation at Charleston
to re-enforce me in time. Should these views be approved, I beg to
suggest that no time should be lost in carrying them out. |
| I have the honor to be, very
respectfully, your obedient servant, |
| W. S. Walker |
| Brigadier-General, Commanding |
|