| General Orders No. 81 |
| |
| Adjt. and Insp. General's Office |
| Richmond, Va., June 11, 1863 |
| |
| I. A court of inquiry having
been convened by direction of the President, on the application of
Lieut. Col. Eugene E. McLean, assistant quartermaster-general, under
Special Orders, No. 282, paragraph XV, of 1862, to examine into and
report upon the conduct of the quartermaster's department of the
Army of the Mississippi while under the control of
Lieutenant-Colonel (then Major) McLean, and having made the required
examination and report, the result is, by direction of the
President, published for the information of all concerned. |
| IX. The court having maturely considered the
evidence adduced, report as the |
| Summary of Facts, |
| regarded by the court of inquiry in the
case of Lieut. Col. E. E. McLean as proved by the evidence elicited
and of record-- |
| *** |
| 12. That the supply of
forage at Corinth was sufficient, though not full, and for a time
restricted in amount and kind, owing to the nature of the
surrounding country and other circumstances. While at Tupelo it was
ample, the army then being located in the vicinity of a country
abounding in forage. |
| 13. That there was but
little forage within reach of Corinth by wagon transportation, and
that little was consumed at an early day of our occupation of that
post and the adjacent counties. |
| 14. That the facilities
afforded by the railroads concentrating at that point, especially
after their partial abandonment to the enemy, were not sufficient
for the transportation of a full supply of forage for the army at
Corinth, and at the same time to supply that army with all other
quartermaster's, commissary, and ordnance stores required, and at
the same time meet the sudden and unexpected demands for the
transportation of large numbers of troops, the sick, &c. |
| 15. That an abundant supply
of corn, and as much long forage as could be found, was purchased by
the quartermaster's department, and deposited along the lines of the
different railroads for shipment to Corinth, and when cars could be
obtained they were generally kept loaded with such forage, ready to
be attached to the passing trains. |
| 16. That the railroads were
worked to their utmost capacity, but that many cases occurred where,
from inability to transport them, the cars found ready loaded with
forage were left by the passing trains on the side tracks of the
railroads, and thus detained or delayed in arriving at their place
of destination. |
| 17. That all side tracks
required for the efficient working of the different railroads were
laid down by the quartermaster's department wherever found
insufficient for the accommodation of the increased business of the
railroads. |
| 18. That a competent
military superintendent of the railroads (a major in the
quartermaster's department) was selected by the presidents of the
railroads, and, with their concurrence, appointed by General
Beauregard, to take upon himself the entire and exclusive control of
all the army transportation by railroad, under the immediate
supervision of General Beauregard, then commanding the forces. |
| *** |
| 23. That for ordinary purposes a sufficient and
permanent force of negro laborers was employed by the
quartermaster's department for loading and unloading the cars at the
railroad depots. |
| 24. That in cases of
emergency sufficient assistance was obtained by details from the
army upon the application of the parties desiring them, as was the
case of the post and ordnance department at the evacuation of
Corinth. |
| 25. That there was a
sufficient number of competent and efficient officers of the
quartermaster's department at all times at the railroad depot at
Corinth to superintend and control the railroad transportation of
the army during the evacuation of that place. |
| 26. That the transportation
operations on the occasion of the evacuation of Corinth were
expeditiously and successfully conducted by energetic and competent
officers of the quartermaster's department, assigned to the special
duty of superintending the transportation of army stores and troops
from that place by rail. |
| 27. That material aid was
rendered by General Bragg and several members of his staff and some
members of the staff of General Beauregard; also by other officers,
as well as by Colonel Benton's regiment and other details from the
army. |
| 28. That there was no public
property left in Corinth upon the evacuation of the place, except a
few tents and broken wagons, some old harness, and some few shells
and other ordnance stores, most of which property appears to have
been damaged or condemned or not worth the cost of its
transportation under the attending circumstances. |
| 29. That there was a loss of
a number of railroad engines and cars loaded with army stores upon
the Memphis and Charleston Railroad on the morning of May 30,
occasioned by the burning of the railroad bridges across the Hatchie
and Tuscumbia Rivers, in obedience to specific orders given the
officers in command at those bridges to destroy them at a certain
hour. |
| 30. That the quartermaster's
department had no notice that the bridges were to be destroyed,
otherwise the trains lost might have been dispatched in time to have
passed the bridges or turned down the Mobile and Ohio Railroad and
thus saved. |
| 31. That there was a loss of
a train of cars containing certain Government property at Booneville
while standing on the track of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad on the
morning of May 30, occasioned by a raid of the enemy's cavalry, over
which the quartermaster's department had no control. |
| *** |
| Opinion of the Court |
| It is the opinion of this
court that, from the facts elicited in the investigation of the
conduct of the quartermaster's department of the Army of the
Mississippi while under the control of Lieut. Col. (then Maj.)
Eugene E. McLean, it appears that the department was managed with
all the energy, efficiency, forethought, and success which could
have been expected under the difficult circumstances attending the
sudden concentration of our armies; the unexpected occupation by the
enemy of our principal fields of supply; the scarcity of the means
of field transportation; the inability to obtain forage within
reasonable reach of the army by means of wagon transportation; the
failure or inability of the railroads of the country to transport
from a distance, when purchased, forage to the army; the closing of
the great markets of New Orleans, Memphis, and Nashville; the
interference by agents of other branches of the service with the
departments of purchases of forage and of transportation, under
Lieutenant-Colonel McLean; the original scarcity throughout the
country of all supplies needed; the continuance of such scarcity in
consequence of the existing blockade of the ports of the
Confederacy, and the inexperience of nearly all quartermasters'
agents in the beginning of the war. |
| It further appears from the
evidence that in the arduous duties attending the evacuation of
Corinth by the Confederate Army under General Beauregard, the
quartermaster's department was fully represented by able and
efficient officers, present at the railroad depot day and night, and
to their activity and judgment is the successful removal of the
public stores, for which the quartermaster's department was
responsible at that place, mainly attributable. That the
quartermaster's department during the day and night preceding the
evacuation was efficiently aided by the personal exertions of
General Bragg and several members of his and General Beauregard's
staff, and by the exertions of Colonel Benton's regiment, together
with other details from the army. |
| It also appears from the
evidence that the evacuation of Corinth, so far as the
quartermaster's department was concerned, was a complete military
success, and that, although so short a time was allowed to remove
the stores, but little property was lost, and that but of small
value, being mostly worthless or condemned stores. The severe losses
of the engines and cars, together with the public property contained
in the latter, destroyed on the morning of the evacuation on the
Hatchie and Tuscumbia Bridges, on the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad by our troops, and on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad at
Booneville by a raid of the enemy's cavalry, are shown from the
evidence to be in no way attributable to the quartermaster's
department. |
| The court is also of opinion
that the investigation has further shown that in the conduct of the
department committed to his charge Lieutenant-Colonel McLean was
prompt, energetic, and efficient in the discharge of all the duties
of his office while chief quartermaster of the army, and that while
in the execution of those duties his instructions to and teachings
of his subordinates contributed much to the success attendant on
their exertions and to the introduction and maintenance of the
proper system and order in the various branches of the department
intrusted to his supervision and control. |
| III. The court of
inquiry of which Col. M. Lewis Clark was president is hereby
dissolved. |
| By order: |
| S. Cooper |
| Adjutant and Inspector-General |