NP, GT 12/19/1862

From the Georgia Telegraph (Macon, Ga.)
 
December 19, 1862
 
{From the New York Herald, Dec. 8th]
Military Campaigning by Rail Roads
   In another column will be found an interesting letter from Washington foreshadowing important exposures of the intrigues of the radicals against General McClellan during the time that he was in command of the forces at Washington and on the peninsula, which finally resulted in his removal. -- It also furnishes some important facts and practical suggestions in reference to the experience of our armies in relying upon railroads as a medium to obtain their supplies while marching into an enemy's country, to which we call the attention of our readers.
   The facts there stated in regard to the result of relying upon railroad communication to furnish supplies for the army on the peninsula over the short distance from the White House, on the Pamunkey to the Chickahominy, also the experience of Pope, with a much less force, in attempting to obtain his supplies over the Orange & Alexandria railroad throw a flood of light upon the events of the past year. They also furnish our readers some idea of the immense sacrifice of life and treasure, which the intrigues of the radicals at Washington against General McClellan have brought upon the country in their vain and fruitless efforts to ruin McClellan and prove themselves great Generals. -- We have here also the facts showing that the railroad from the White House to the Chickahominy, a distance of only twenty miles {on the Richmond & York River RR}, was, when well stocked with engines and cars, inadequate for the transportation of supplies for the army, forcing the artillery and cavalry horses to subsist a great deal of the time on half allowances of forage. On the other had, it is also shown that Pope, with a much less force, was unable to obtain at Warrenton, one-third the distance to Richmond, sufficient supplies for his troops before he was joined by the Army of the Potomac. These facts are also borne out by the statement of Prince de Joinville in his review of the Peninsula campaign, where he states that an invading army in this country can not safely march over two or three days from their base of supplies without water communication.

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