Closing City Rail Gaps

Closing City Rail Gaps

A problem that is frequently included under the gauge issue was the connecting of railroads within cities. When railroads began to be constructed, in the 1840’s, cities were not sure they wanted the fire hazard of the spark-spewing locomotives in their city centers. Additionally, if trains were forced to stop on the outskirts, there would be business created for citizens in handling freight, passengers and baggage between railroad depots and during stays enforced by railroad scheduling. Thus, few cities had railroads running through town. But the necessity to move military supplies through quickly, and the loss of laborers to the army, made it obvious to all that connections had to be made for the war.

By the end of 1861, many city gaps had been closed and others would be soon. Memphis, Petersburg, Richmond, Charleston, Augusta, Montgomery and Houston were closed, though some with temporary tracks and some with restrictions on the use of the tracks. Though it had been an issue, it was mostly resolved by the end of 1862.

Below are the cities with the gauge breaks that mattered and the efforts that closed the breaks:

Alabama

Montgomery

A gap of about two miles existed between the Montgomery & West Point Railroad and the Alabama & Florida (of Alabama) Railroad. Though the roads were of different gauges, the elimination of drayage across town would be a major cost and time saving. It was so obvious that the state legislature had authorized the connection in December, 1861. Almost immediately, the President of the Alabama & Florida Railroad asked Richmond for $35,000 to allow him to connect the two roads by building a track to the Montgomery & West Point Railroad’s terminal. Freight and personnel could then make the connection by just crossing the platform from one train to the other. The savings to the government would pay for the connection in less than two years. For some unrecorded reason, this proposal was not accepted.

For some also unrecorded reason, the subject of the connection was resurrected in the spring of 1863. The need, benefits and costs were reviewed and the work authorized in late August. Quartermaster Captain J. M. Hottel was instructed by Major Sims to make the connection. By mid-September, the job had been completed. But by November, it was clear that the work had been hastily completed and the grade of the connection was too steep. Major Sims contracted with the Montgomery & Eufaula Railroad to use their hands to correct the grade, but the work was not completed until the arrival of iron from the Alabama & Florida (of Florida) Railroad in April, 1864. The connection was owned by the Government and operated under a government contract by the Alabama & Florida (of Alabama) Railroad.

Savannah

On November 27, 1861, Major William S. Ashe, Railroad Coordinator, recommended to President Davis the connection of the Savannah, Albany & Gulf Railroad with the Central (of Georgia) Railroad in Savannah. The distance to be constructed was 1,400 yards and required no grading. The connection would allow rolling stock from other railroads, particularly the Central, to be loaned to the Albany road when required and would allow the escape of the Albany rolling stock if that road was attacked from the south.

As late as May, 1862, no work had been accomplished because the Albany road refused to bear the entire cost of the work. On the 13^th the Secretary of War authorized $6,000 for the work. Progress was swift and the connection was completed by June 6^th. The route was up Liberty Street and, because of the width of the street, no inconvenience was anticipated to the public. The total cost was $9,354.

Georgia

Augusta

This city had three railroads arriving. On November 27, 1861, the Confederacy’s first Railroad Coordinator, Major William S. Ashe, wrote President Davis that the connection between the South Carolina Railroad and the Georgia Railroad already existed, but those railroads did not connect with the Augusta & Savannah Railroad. The distance to be run was about 600 yards, with no grading required. The Savannah road had agreed to build the connection and to buy it from the Government after the war. Ashe implied that money was required for the work, but did not mention an amount.

In late February, 1862, General R. E. Lee, Commanding coastal defenses in the southeast, wrote Georgia Governor J. E. Brown that the connection was essential and could be made in one week if the city gave permission to use the route the Savannah road wanted to use. Unfortunately, the City Council wanted a route more than twice as long – which the Savannah company would build, if the State ordered its construction and paid for it. By April 8, with no progress evident, General Pemberton sent General T. F. Drayton to convince the Augusta Council to get the job done at once. General Pemberton had already written twice before, but without action in Augusta. General Drayton sent his aide to Augusta and found that a battle was in progress between the Confederate Navy, the Macon & Western Railroad, the Milledgeville Railroad and others regarding who would provide the iron for the track.

Sometime between April 23, 1862 and February 7, 1863, the connection was completed, using sixty-nine tons of rail. The Quartermaster in Augusta suggested that the connection and the remaining twenty-six tons of rail be transferred to the account of Colonel William M. Wadley, the present Railroad Coordinator. The accounting transfer took place as recommended. A direct connection between the South Carolina Railroad and the Augusta & Savannah Railroad was apparently laid in the last quarter of 1864.

South Carolina

Charleston

The Charleston & Savannah Railroad was essential to defending both cities and the intervening coast. Unfortunately, the railroad could not afford to build the bridge across the Ashley River into Charleston proper, a group of company ferries being used to carry freight and passengers across the river. A wagon toll bridge had been constructed across the river by another company, but its use during the early days of the war convinced the railroad, the State and the military that a railroad bridge was essential, it being determined that strengthening of the wagon bridge to carry the cars was not feasible. In May, 1862, Bentley D. Hasell was elevated to the railroad’s presidency and commenced the construction of the Ashley River railroad bridge, constructed with State of South Carolina funds. As always, labor shortages slowed the work and iron was not available to the company.

In late January, 1863, General Beauregard inquired as to the prospects for completion of the link. When informed that the bridge was almost completed, but still required 110 tons of new rail, the General instructed the railroad to get it from the iron of the Brunswick & Albany (previously Florida) Railroad at Tebeauville, on the Savannah, Albany & Gulf Railroad, some ninety-six miles south of Savannah. General Mercer was advised that the allocation of 3,000 feet of rail had been approved.

The iron was collected and was nearly laid when, on March 14, Alexander H. Brown, President of the Charleston Bridge Company, informed Robert L. Singletary (the new Charleston & Savannah Railroad President), that the new bridge had been built on the right of way of his company and they would only allow military traffic over the new bridge; all other traffic would have to be carried over the wagon bridge or use the new railroad bridge under a toll arrangement that had not yet been worked out between the two companies.

The issue was resolved in some manner and the first train crossed the bridge into Charleston on April 7, 1863. The first positive proof of the use of the bridge is a bill from the railroad to the Confederate Army for $365 for seventy-three car loads of cattle across the Charleston Bridge. It is reasonable to assume the new bridge was used as needed by the Government, but there are only a handful of bills to prove its use.

The final page of the story is that of the payment for the new bridge and its iron rails. The railroad could use it, but had not felt the need to build it on its own; the State had funded $35,000 of the construction cost (to be forwarded to the Confederate Government) and wanted the bridge to permit the saving of the railroad’s rolling stock (partially owned by the State) in case of Union attack; the Army wanted the bridge to aid in its defense plans. The question came to a head in October and November when the South Carolina request for reimbursement for their $35,000 reached the desk of the Secretary of War. After much discussion, the Government paid for the entire work, reimbursing the South Carolina funds, and owned, as before, the rails used on the bridge.

After the bridge was in operation, the question arises as to the connection made in Charleston. Cars crossing the new bridge landed on new track laid on Spring Street and preceded about a mile to a connection with the South Carolina Railroad tracks between King and Meeting Street. The connection was at a right angle and, since there was no turntable there, the cars had to be backed from west of the river to the connection. It appears that drayage was used to move freight to the depot, a block or two away. Of course, this was not efficient and several alternatives were proposed in early 1864. The best options were a crane to lift the goods, a curve of track or a turntable. After much discussion, a turntable was installed and appears to have been the final solution.

The bridge and turntable provided the required connection, though the railroad claimed the bridge was little used. It appears to have been used in the shipment of cotton to Wilmington in early 1864, but does not appear to have been a regular connection; it also appears that almost all traffic up the Charleston & Savannah Railroad during the war was destined for Charleston. This makes the connection exactly what the South Carolina Government intended – an escape route for the road’s rolling stock when the enemy approached.

Tennessee

Memphis

In mid-February, 1862, General Polk contracted with the Memphis railroads to lay track to connect the three roads so that military troops, stores and ordnance could be rapidly passed through the city for reinforcement of threatened areas and for evacuation of the city and the railroads’ rolling stock in case of Union attack. The Memphis & Ohio Railroad, from its depot on the north edge of the city, laid 1.7 miles of track down Main Street to the Mississippi & Tennessee Railroad depot on the south side of the city. The Memphis & Ohio Railroad was connected by another 0.9 mile long track, laid down Walnut and Dunlap Streets, to the Memphis & Charleston Railroad depot on the east side of the city. Both tracks were completed and in use around mid-March. All three railroads participated in the two projects. At least some of the iron was purchased from the Memphis & Little Rock Railroad (which terminated on the west side of the Mississippi River). The Memphis & Charleston company was paid $15,138 and the Memphis & Ohio, $16,500; the Mississippi & Tennessee cost has not been discovered.

As soon as the Main Street track was laid down, the citizens demanded that a city railroad be run on the tracks, perhaps using cars brought up from New Orleans. There is no indication the cars were requested before New Orleans fell.

The connecting tracks were temporary and to be removed as soon as no longer required by the Confederate military. The city was captured June 6, 1862. In an official Union Army map, dated May 25, 1865, the tracks are not shown.

Nashville

Little information has been found on the connection constructed in Nashville in 1861. On September 28, the Richmond Dispatch reported that the trestle connecting the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad and the Nashville & Northwestern Railroad had been completed and all railroads entering Nashville were now connected. The one-half mile connection between the two depots was apparently constructed by the Memphis, Clarksville & Louisville Railroad since a report to the Tennessee General Assembly on October 1^st reported the cost of the work being $10,000 to the Memphis road, $371 to the Nashville & Northwestern and $4,235 to the Edgefield & Kentucky railroads.

Texas

Houston

Two separate connections were constructed in Houston. Both connections were essential to the plans for defending the Texas coast from invasion.

1. The Galveston & Houston Junction Railroad was chartered by the State as a commercial company and sold stock. Its purpose was the connection of the Galveston, Houston & Henderson Railroad to the Houston & Texas Central Railroad and into Houston. In April, 1861, the road was mentioned as favorably reported out of the Legislature’s Committee on Internal Improvements. In December, the commander at Galveston requested of the railroad’s president, V. M. Brown, a report of what difficulties had prevented him from completing the road by this time and whether any further legislation was required. The reply is not known, but in July, 1862, the company advertised in the Houston newspaper for proposals to build a draw bridge over the Buffalo Bayou and to do the grading, tieing and track laying on about one and three-quarters miles of the road.

Fourteen months after the request for proposals, the road’s Engineer reported to General Magruder that 230,000 feet of timber required for the road’s construction was at Beaumont (90 miles away) and the road was unable to get the timber transported on the Texas & New Orleans Railroad. He requested the General order the transportation be provided. A month later, the road reported that the timber was arriving in Houston, but the company had been unable to hire teams to move the material to the work location because of the shortage of private teams. Again, he requested Army support.

The Engineer reported in mid-November that all the grading had been completed. 180,000 feet of timber had been sawed, with 120,000 feet delivered to the work site and 60,000 feet still at Beaumont, awaiting transportation. 4,000 cross ties were needed for main and side tracks, but he had not been able to purchase them. Once the ties were available, the road could be laid in ten days. If the timber in Beaumont was delivered and cut and the ties obtained, the road could be ready in sixty days. The piles for the drawbridge had been delivered and the iron for it received. General Magruder responded by giving the Engineer of the road an order permitting him to impress any timber suitable for cross ties in a particular area near Houston and by authorizing the detailing of six carpenters from the unarmed state troops. Transportation for the iron rails was also assured.

The Austin newspaper reported in December 1864, that the Act incorporating the company on February 25, 1863 was modified to require the completion of the road within twelve months of this amendment. The date of the amendment was November 14^th, 1864, indicating that the road was still not complete at that date.

On May 3^rd, 1865, a special order was issued assigning Major George R. Wilson, Engineer Corps, to construct a bridge over the White Oak Bayou in order to complete the road. He was ordered to complete the task with utmost rapidity. This was the only point where the Army was in charge of any part of the connection work. A Houston newspaper article implies that the road commenced operation in October, 1865, but that might be after repairs or reconstruction.

2. A 1,600-foot long connection was desired between the Texas & New Orleans Railroad and the Houston & Texas Central Railroad by running track through Houston. The Galveston & Houston Junction Railroad was asked to undertake this work in a December 1861 request, but did not agree to the request. On September 8, 1863 a special order specified that Major J. S. Sellers, Quartermaster, was to furnish Captain Herriot with six wagons and any other assistance that Capt. Heriot required in the work of connecting the railroad through Houston. Fifty hands were desired and twenty appeared to be possible the next day. Ten days later, President William J. Hutchins, of the Houston & Texas Central Railroad, was directed to send a locomotive and tender to Beaumont, on the Texas & New Orleans road, but replied that the connection was still under construction. On November 12^th, Capt. Heriot reported that the connection was complete and in use.

A bill was submitted by the Texas & New Orleans Railroad for the work done and materials used to make the connection. The total was $25,620, with $21,000 of it being for the rails, chairs and spikes.

Virginia

Petersburg

The value of connecting the north-south railroads entering Petersburg had been obvious for years, but had been prevented by the city fathers. With troubled times arriving in early 1861, the Governor insisted that the connections of the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac and the Richmond & Petersburg Railroads in Richmond and the Richmond & Petersburg and Petersburg Railroads must be constructed immediately. The Richmond & Petersburg road had made surveys during the summer of 1860 for both cities. Everyone knew that the bridge into Petersburg over the Appomattox River was not of sufficient strength to carry trains and would have to be improved. When the Confederate government arrived in Richmond, the Quartermaster General and General Lee added their influence to the making of the connections.

Three weeks later, Daniel offered to construct temporary connections immediately, suitable for only single cars, to be carrying only military supplies and to be pulled by horses. These temporary connections would be of no use to the railroads and thus they would not contribute to the cost of the work, but would buy the materials used when the Government no longer needed them. Which solution was accepted is unclear, though the Richmond Dispatch reported that the first train, bearing cannon, had passed over the road on August 12^th. The Appomattox Bridge still needed to be improved or a railroad bridge constructed.

Business proceeded well enough until October 11^th, when the Petersburg Station Agent of the Richmond & Petersburg road reported to his Superintendent that the recent rains had turned the whole area into a mud hole and would get worse unless the Government improved their track and paved one street. In his report on October 20^th, he made it clear that the roads were running light locomotives on the Government track and that the whole area was blocked up with too many cars and too little track space. The roads were not able to devote enough time from their own switching duties to be able to shunt cars between stations. By November 26^th, the Army Quartermaster for Petersburg informed the Quartermaster General that a locomotive was required for the purpose of moving Government freight from one depot to another in the city. The issue was quickly transferred to Transportation Coordinator Ashe. Ashe must have come to some agreement with the Petersburg railroads since there is no evidence of a Government locomotive on that track in the following months.

The situation seems to have improved when the Legislature approved the connection of the roads by the railroads themselves, to carry both commercial and Government freight and passengers. These were extensions to their roads and not temporary connections. But on April 7, 1862, General Lee wrote both the Richmond & Petersburg and the Petersburg Railroad presidents that the construction of the connection was “imperfect” and he desired them to correct it at once, with whatever Government assistance it required. This implies that the track belonged to the two companies. However, on the 12^th, General Lee informed Capt. Thomas R. Sharp that he was not into the details of the job and Sharp was to arrange the track so that a train could pass from one railroad to the other.

Three days later, a proposal for the cost of the labor and materials to build a Government bridge at Petersburg was given to a David Bisset. There are also receipts for a foreman/superintendent/manager on the Confederate track, from at least March 15^th. Then, on May 19^th, Hugh Rice, Superintendent of the Manassas Gap Railroad, was paid $488 for reconstructing the Government track in Petersburg (using convict labor). Starting May 28^th, the Government paid the first of several railroads for the rental of a locomotive for use on the Government track in Petersburg, with the crew paid for by the Government directly. It appears that is the date that the reconstructed Petersburg track went into operation.

In late May, 1863, the need for repairs to the Government bridge into Petersburg became the catalyst for a rethinking and reconstruction of the entire Petersburg bridge and track. To no one’s surprise, labor was hard to come by and work was delayed until August. By mid-September, the 220 piles had been driven and the bridge completed, though track work continued until early October.

After an unpleasant dispute arose regarding procedures on the Government track, Major Sims, Confederate Railroad Bureau Chief, wrote a proposition for working the Government track in both Petersburg and Richmond. The document was approved by the Quartermaster General on January 13, 1864.

After the war arrived at the Petersburg fortifications, the smoke emitted by the locomotives arriving in the city from Richmond became a red flag for Union artillery batteries. By September, General Lee prohibited locomotives from using the bridge into the city. Cars seem to have been moved across by horse power at times.

Richmond

1. The value of connecting the north-south railroads entering Richmond had been obvious for years, but had been prevented by the city fathers. With troubled times arriving in early 1861, the Governor insisted that the connections of the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac and the Richmond & Petersburg Railroads in Richmond and the Richmond & Petersburg and Petersburg Railroads must be constructed immediately. The Richmond & Petersburg road had made surveys during the summer of 1860 for both cities. When the Confederate government arrived in Richmond, the Quartermaster General and General Lee added their influence to the making of the connections.

On June 27, 1861, P. V. Daniel, Jr., President of the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad and immediate past president of the Richmond & Petersburg Railroad, wrote President Davis that the railroads had long desired to make these connections, but with the opposition of the two cities, the Legislature would not authorize the work. The work was now authorized, but the affected railroads were without funds to do the $75,000 projects. The roads had lost much revenue from the termination of traffic to the North and his road had also lost its Potomac steamships. Daniel proposed that the savings to the Government from having the connections was such that the Government should advance the cost of the work to the railroads with repayment after the war or from freight charges credited against the advance during the war. Three weeks later, Daniel offered to construct temporary connections immediately, suitable for only single cars, to be carrying only military supplies and to be pulled by horses. These temporary connections would be of no use to the railroads and thus they would not contribute to the cost of the work, but would buy the materials used when the Government no longer needed them.

On July 23^rd a contract was awarded to a Petersburg contractor to connect the two north-south Richmond railroads (the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac and the Richmond & Petersburg). The connection headed north from the Petersburg depot, up the steep grade of 8^th Street to its intersection with Broad Street, where a sharp left turn put the two roads in contact. The entire distance was about six-tenths of a mile. The most difficult piece of construction was the bridge across the canal, just one block north of the Petersburg depot. Known costs to the Confederate Government for the job were $22,180 for building the work and $557 for engineer services; the source and cost of the iron was not specified.

When Thomas R. Sharp hauled the two Alexandria, Loudoun & Hampshire Railroad locomotives south from Leesburg, one was allocated to the Virginia Central Railroad. A September 7^th receipt for that locomotive shows that included in the deal with the Confederate Government was the requirement for the Central to provide a locomotive for use on the Richmond connector track (though not necessarily the engine received from Sharp).

The first use of the track was about September 24^th, with the locomotive J. R. Anderson pushing cars up the hill in front of a crowd of some five hundred spectators. The Tredegar-built Virginia Central Railroad locomotive had no problem with the grade and was promptly purchased by Major Ashe for $7,500. The engineer and fireman were Army employees. A turntable was installed in the summer of 1862.

Through the rest of the war, there were numerous alternate suggestions for Richmond railroad connections, all driven by the desire to get around the grade problem on this track. Many of the other solutions had the additional feature of connecting other roads as well as these two. None of the offered solutions were considered worth the time, expense and labor to construct.

2. The second Richmond connection was far less pressing, the connection of the Virginia Central and the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroads. This connection would be in addition to their connecting at a junction about twenty-two miles north of the city. The additional link was only required in the case of the loss of that junction to the enemy, in which case, the need would be to evacuate the city’s rolling stock and railroad supplies as quickly as possible to some point south of Richmond by way of the Richmond & Petersburg Railroad connection at the Fredericksburg road’s depot.

Due to the threat of General McClelland’s assault from the Peninsula, a temporary track was laid on ties up the hill from the Central’s depot to the Fredericksburg’s depot, using Broad Street, on May 28, 1862. Central locomotives used the track a day or two later to get up the hill. After their removal, the tracks were removed from the street crossings to facilitate traffic. A turntable, taken by Sharp from the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, was installed in mid-June by Hugh Longest (Sharp’s foreman) to facilitate the use of this three-road connection.

This piece of track saw some use, but was also the scene of several car runaways, as cars took off down the hill on their own. The result was usually the total loss of the cars when they crashed at the bottom of the hill. The track was removed completely in late January 1863. The connection was less valuable than the iron rails that had been used to construct it.

3. A third connection was mentioned on occasion to connect the Richmond & York River Railroad to the Richmond & Petersburg or Virginia Central Railroads. This idea never got far because of the limited value of the York River road, much of which was removed to provide rails to other roads. The rolling stock was eventually hauled over the Richmond streets without the need to lay track.

Below are the cities with the gauge breaks that mattered and whose breaks were never closed (in every case, there was a change of gauge required by one of the roads in order to make a connection):

Georgia

West Point

The Montgomery & West Point and Atlanta & West Point Railroads met with a common depot.

North Carolina

Charlotte

The North Carolina and Charlotte & South Carolina Railroads met with adjoining depots.

Wilmington

The Wilmington & Manchester and Wilmington & Weldon Railroads were divided by the Cape Fear River. Since the two railroads owned the connecting ferry, they were less than excited about spending the great sum of money required to build the draw/swing bridge required for their connection. The required bridge was built after the war. Had it been constructed during the war, the gauge issue would still have been present.

Virginia

Lynchburg

The Orange & Alexandria Railroad met the Virginia & Tennessee and South Side Railroads at a common depot.

Petersburg

The South Side and Norfolk & Petersburg Railroads were the same gauge and connected very early in the war, but without leaving any written records. These two roads crossed the north-south railroads on the Government connector, but were of different gauges.

Richmond

The Richmond & Danville Railroad did not connect to any of the other roads and no attempt was made to connect them because of the gauge issue. A track from the Danville depot to the Virginia Central depot would have been easy to construct, if the need had been felt.