|
A look at the shipping of armor from Richmond to
Portsmouth for the CSS Virginia is found here |
| Navy capital ships have always been
very expensive in terms of money, manpower and resources. For the
Confederacy, the cost of its ironclads was mostly in terms of iron
and railroad shipping used. The shipping had to include the
movements from the source of the iron, to the rolling mill and
then to the shipyard. (The requirements for wood shipping were
also large, but the records are too incomplete for
analysis.) |
|
Below is presented the information derived from the
Confederate Navy construction documents in the National Archives,
as far as the data is present. The source of the iron is rarely
shown, though there is one document listing 53 tons of scrap iron
going from Charleston to Atlanta. The source of the armor plates
is the Schofield & Markham Rolling Mill in Atlanta. The
destinations are rarely known, but must have included every
ironclad building site, except Richmond, Yazoo City and Shreveport
(yes, there was a shipment to Norfolk). Unfortunately, the
railroad documents are so incomplete that we cannot track the
shipments, so this data is based on when the plates were presented
to the Government for payment (ie, after rolling and sometimes
after drilling the bolt holes).
|
| Date |
Tons Plate (1) |
Cars f/Plates |
Tons Iron (2) |
Cars f/Iron |
| 4/25/62 |
150 |
21 (3) |
|
|
| 5/17/62 |
175 |
25 |
|
|
| 6/30/62 |
372 |
52 (4) |
819 |
102 |
| 7/12/62 |
293 |
41 |
295 |
37 |
| 7/23/62 |
160 |
22 (5) |
286 |
36 |
| 8/19/62 |
119 |
17 |
119 |
15 |
| 8/30/62 |
211 |
30 |
211 |
26 |
| 9/13/62 |
211 |
30 |
211 |
26 |
| 9/29/62 |
58 |
8 |
191 |
24 |
| 10/8/62 |
196 |
27 |
196 |
25 |
| 10/24/62 |
270 |
38 |
270 |
34 |
| 11/1/62 |
89 |
12 |
89 |
11 |
| 11/21/62 |
154 |
19 |
154 |
19 |
| 12/15/62 |
120 |
17 (6) |
120 |
15 |
| 12/26/62 |
235 |
33 |
235 |
29 |
| 1/9/63 |
117 |
16 |
117 |
15 |
| 1/16/63 |
100 |
14 |
100 |
13 |
| 2/23/63 |
117 |
16 |
117 |
15 |
| 3/3/63 |
116 |
16 |
116 |
15 |
| 3/21/63 |
164 |
23 |
164 |
21 |
| 3/28/63 |
115 |
16 |
115 |
14 |
| 4/4/63 |
59 |
8 |
59 |
7 |
| 4/18/63 |
214 |
30 |
214 |
27 |
| 4/25/63 |
160 |
22 |
160 |
20 |
| 5/8/63 |
143 |
20 |
143 |
18 |
| 5/16/63 |
103 |
14 |
103 |
13 |
| 6/15/63 |
140 |
20 (7) |
140 |
18 |
| 6/30/63 |
194 |
27 |
194 |
24 |
| |
4555 |
635 |
4938 |
619 |
|
| Notes: |
(1) |
Long tons, 2240 lbs |
|
(2) |
Short tons, 2000 lbs |
|
(3) |
To Charleston, 522 bars |
|
(4) |
To Norfolk |
|
(5) |
To Savannah for the "Atlanta" |
|
(6) |
To Charleston, 812 bars |
|
(7) |
Production reduced because of a shortage of
iron |
|
|
An additional 26 tons (4 carloads) appear to have
been rolled at the Etowah Iron Works, drilled in Atlanta and then
shipped to Selma in late 1862.
|
|
The data above shows us two ways the Navy's ironclad
building program impacted the railroads of the central South.
First, there were at least 1,234 car loads of other supplies that
were not delivered because of the Navy's armor shipments. That is
about 100 train loads of supplies that got left at depots, waiting
transportation, when the most common complaint against the
railroads was lack of capacity.
|
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Second, the iron used to make the armor (at least
5,102 short tons) would could have made enough rail to have laid a
bit over 51 miles of track, both rails. Where was this rail
needed? The Piedmont RR, the Blue Mountain extension, the
Montgomery to Selma line -- and maintenance on the main lines
throughout the eastern Confederacy.
|
|
Focusing on the cost of the armor alone does not show
the full cost of the ironclad program. Ironclads also required
very large amounts of timber, months of labor by scarce mechanics,
large quantities of building iron and the guns (some 125 big ones)
to arm them.
|
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All of the above cost must be balanced against what
the ironclads did or reasonably could have done. My belief is that
the ironclads did or could have impacted the war only at
Charleston and Wilmington.
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